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The Age of Criminal Responsibility in
an Era of Violence: Has Great Britain
Set a New International Standard?
ABSTRACT

With the alarming rise of juvenile crime and violence
duringthe past decade,policymakers across the international
community have struggled to develop effective juvenile
criminal justice systems apart from the existing systems
tailored to adults. The wide variations in methods and
philosophies utilized in different states indicate that there is
no consensus on the proper treatment of young offenders.
Using the recent Bulger case as a focus, this Note examines
two competing paradigms of juvenile justice found within the
British juvenile justice system, with particularemphasis on
the age of criminal responsibility. After discussing recent
developments in Great Britain'sjuvenile justice system, this
Note analyzes minimum internationalstandards of juvenile
justice and the impact of the unification of the European
Community. This Note concludes that although other states
are unlikely to follow Great Britain's lead in punishing the
extremely young offender who commits an especially brutal
crime, such a system may be necessary to combat the
growing problem of crime committed by the very young.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The rising crime rates1 in industrial and developing nations
have policymakers frantically searching for a solution. 2 During
the past decade, juvenile violence has reached new heights,
making the development of effective juvenile criminal justice
systems a priority on the international agenda.3 Most states have
dealt with the increase in juvenile offenders by incorporating
juvenile delinquents into their existing criminal justice structures.
This practice of handling juvenile offenders within the existing
criminal system, however, has proven ineffective with regard to
the rehabilitation of juvenile offenders. 4 Most states believe that
juvenile offenders are more likely to be rehabilitated than adult
offenders; therefore, a juvenile justice system should embrace the
notion of reform. Moreover, assuming that juveniles do not have

the same mental capacity to understand the criminality of their
actions as adult offenders, the juvenile justice system should
provide more lenient sentences than the adult system. 5 However,
because the criminal justice systems of most states developed

around the adult offender, these systems have failed to address
the special issues related to the juvenile offender.
Although many states recognize the problems with
assimilating juvenile offenders into adult criminal justice systems,
few have found the development of a separate juvenile justice
system quick or easy. While many states agree that an adult
criminal justice system should not handle juvenile offenders,

1.
The number of juveniles arrested for homicide in the United States
increased 162% between 1984 and 1991. Dewey G. Cornell, Juvenile Homicide:
A Growing National Problem, 11 BEHAVIORAL SCI. L. 389 (1993); see also Bejing
Police IncreasePatrolsto Combat Rise in 'Serious" Crime, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD
BROADCASTS, Pt. 3 Asia-Pacific (November 10, 1994); Police Chief Says Crime Rate
Has Risen by 9.7% in First 10 Months of 1994, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD
BROADCASTS, Pt. 2 Central Europe and the Balkans (November 7, 1994); Ron
Harris, Brazil Orders in Military to Combat Crime in Rio: Army Will Try to Stem

Crippling Vwlence and Corruption. Government Admits the Move is Risky, L.A.
TIMES, November 2, 1994, at Al; U.S. Rates of Violent Crime Rising, CHI. TRIB.,
October 31, 1994, at 3.
See generally RICHARD J. TERRILL, WORLD CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS: A
2.
SURVEY (1992) (comparative study of world criminal justice systems, organized by

country).
See infra part III. See generally MANUEL LOPEZ-REY, GUIDE TO UNITED
3.
NATIONS CRIMINAL POLICY (A.E. Bottoms series ed., 1980)
4.
See, e.g., LOPEZ-REY, supra.
See J. Neville Turner, The James Bulger Case: A Challenge to Juvenile
5.
Justice Theories, 68 LAW INST. J. 734, 736-37 (discussing the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child and its application in states'juvenile justice

systems).
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there is no consensus on the proper and most effective treatment
of these young offenders. 6 Each state's juvenile justice system
provides for different ages of criminal responsibility, different
levels of sanctions (imprisonment versus community-based
alternatives), and different durations of sanctions for various
crimes. Underlying these differences is the issue of whether a
juvenile justice system based on a justice model, which has
retribution as its primary goal, serves the interests of juveniles
and society more effectively than one based on a welfare model,
which gives priority to the protection and rehabilitation of juvenile
7
offenders.
Recent events in Great Britain 8 directed the international
community's attention to the British juvenile justice system. On
November 25, 1993, the Crown Court convicted two eleven-yearold boys for the murder of a two-year-old toddler, James Bulger. 9
The court tried and convicted the two boys as adults because at
the time of the murder both boys exceeded Great Britain's age of
criminal responsibility, which is ten years old.' 0 The conviction of
the boys ignited an international debate over the proper treatment
of juvenile offenders within the criminal justice system and the
age at which a nation's criminal justice system should hold a
child fully responsible for his or her criminal actions.
Using the recent Bulger case as a backdrop, this Note
examines the current British juvenile justice system, with

6.
See U.N. DEPT OF INrL ECONOMICS & SOCIAL AFFAIRS, SEVENTH U.N.
CONGRESS ON THE PREVENTION OF CRIME AND THE TREATMENT OF OFFENDERS, U.N.
Doc. A/C.121/22 Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. E.86.1V.1 (1985) (adoption of the Beijing
Rules) [hereinafter SEVENTH CONGRESS]. The member states have nevertheless
adopted minimum standards for the administration of juvenile justice. By
adopting minimum standards requiring a separate juvenile criminal system, the
member states recognized that juvenile offenders require special attention in the
criminal system. Id. at 19. See infra part III.A.1.
7.
See generally LOPEZ-REY, supra note 3. See infra text accompanying
notes 25-26 (distinguishing the two models).
8.
Throughout England's history, the country has been referred to as
England, Great Britain, and the United Kingdom. In 1706, England and Wales
united with Scotland, and this alliance was named Great Britain. In 1922, when
the southern counties of Ireland formed the Irish Free State, the name of Great
Britain changed again to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland. TERRILL, supra note 2, at 1. This Note refers to Great Britain and the
laws of Great Britain even though specific statutes are not applicable to Scotland
and are applicable to Northern Ireland. The reader should be aware that while all
the statutes addressed in this Note are applicable to England and Wales, the

specific application of the laws in Scotland and Northern Ireland is not addressed.
9.
William E. Schmidt, 2 British Boys, Both 11, Guilty of Murdering
Toddler,N.Y. TIMES, November 25, 1993, at A3. For an outline of the British court
system, see infra Appendix I.
10.
Id.
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particular emphasis on the age of criminal responsibility. In Part
II, this Note discusses the debate over the justice and welfare

models of juvenile justice in Great Britain in the context of the
Bulger case and reviews the recent developments in Great
Britain's juvenile justice system. In Part III, this Note analyzes
the international and European Community debate over juvenile
justice systems.
The minimum international standards of
juvenile justice promulgated by the United Nations are compared
to Great Britain's juvenile justice system. Part III also discusses
the differences between European states' juvenile offender laws in
light of the unification of the European Community.
For
comparative purposes, France's juvenile justice system is
contrasted with that of Great Britain.
This Note concludes that the young age of' criminal
responsibility adopted by the British juvenile justice system is not
likely to become an international standard in the near future.
Although the British system allows for the necessary punishment
of an extremely young offender who commits an especially brutal
crime, other states are not ready to lower the age of criminal
responsibility in their juvenile justice systems. However, if violent
crime among the very young continues to rise, states may soon
fird that punishment of the very young, but brutal, criminal is
necessary to combat this problem.

II. THE DEBATE OVER JUVENILE JUSTICE IN GREAT BRITAIN

A. HistoricalBackground of the Debate
Before 1906, the laws of Great Britain did not distinguish
between juvenile and adult criminals.11 Both commentators and
the public criticized the system as incredibly harsh because
British courts tried and sentenced children as adults, regardless
of the offense committed. 12 Furthermore, under Great Britain's

11.
TERRILL, supra note 2, at 78. See also PATRICK WILSON, CHILDREN WHO
KILL (1973) (general study of the development of the treatment of young offenders
in Great Britain). This treatment even extended to the death penalty. When a
court found a child guilty of murder, the child's position was no different from
that of an adult the court pronounced a sentence of death. Id. at 13-14.
12.
See WILSON, supra, at 13-14. The United States also treated young
offenders as adults during most of the 19th century, to the point of being willing
to impose the death penalty on such offenders. One scholar documented twentysix executions in the United States between 1642 and 1899 for crimes committed
by persons under the age of sixteen. Victor L. Streib, Death Penaltyfor Children:
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pre-1906 criminal justice system, juvenile offenders were
incarcerated in adult criminal facilities,13 which were not
conducive to the rehabilitation of the child.1 4 Rather than
reforming the child, imprisonment in adult institutions actually
increased the possibility
that the child would violate the law again
5

upon release. 1
During the first half of the nineteenth century, juvenile
justice reform movements had failed to capture the support of the
British Parliament.' 6 The Youthful Offenders Act of 1854 (1854
Act) represented the first effort in Great Britain to differentiate
juveniles from adults in the criminal system. 17 However, the
1854 Act merely created reformatory schools, which confined only
some child criminals after their conviction; other juveniles still
served time in adult prisons.' 8 Although the development of
reformatory schools signaled the beginning of the separation of
juvenile and adult offenders, the 1854 Act failed to provide
separate punishment schemes for the juvenile offender, and the
adult court system continued to try all juvenile cases.19
Consequently, the 1854 Act failed to create any real separation
between child and adult criminals because the court system still
treated them the same.
In response to the realization that children needed to be
treated differently than adults in the criminal justice system, the
British Parliament enacted the Children's Act in 1908, which
created the first juvenile court system in Great Britain.2 0 The Act
mandated that the newly created juvenile courts adjudicate all
offenses (with the exception of murder) committed by children
between seven and sixteen years of age. 2 1 The juvenile courts
also had jurisdiction over all issues of care involving children

The American Experience with Capital Punishment for Crimes Committed While
UnderAge Eighteen, 36 OKIA. L. REV. 613, 619 tbl. 1 (1983).
13.
14.
15.

TERRILL, supranote 2, at 77-78.
Id. at 78.
Id.

16.

Id.

17.
18.
19.

Id.
Id.
Id.

20.
Id. These first "juvenile courts," and even the courts of the current
British juvenile justice system, are not separate tribunals like juvenile courts in
the United States. The British juvenile court is simply a special sitting of the
Magistrates' Court to hear only juvenile matters.
Id. See also Juvenile
Delinquency Act, 18 U.S.C. § 5031 (1988). For an explanation of how the juvenile

courts fit within the British court system, see infra Appendix I.
21.
TERRILL, supra note 2, at 78. Children who committed murder were
still tried in the adult criminal courts. Id.
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younger than fourteen years of age. 22 Because Great Britain's
first juvenile courts remained a part of the adult court system,
however, the Children's Act did not actually advance the goal of
separation. Although the first efforts to differentiate juvenile and
adult offenders were not very effective, Parliament did recognize
that the needs of young offenders differed from those of adult
offenders. 23 Thus, even the initial attempts to create a British
juvenile justice system were based on the theory that the young
are more malleable than adults and are more likely to respond
positively to individual rehabilitative treatment, even after
committing serious offenses. 2 4 Thus, in 1908 the Children's Act
marked the first step in a trend in Great Britain toward removing
and penal systems
juvenile offenders from the adult adjudication
25
in order to address their special needs.
Since that first step, Great Britain's juvenile justice system
has vacillated between two paradigms-the justice model and the
welfare model. The welfare model advocates a juvenile justice
system with the ultimate goals of protecting and rehabilitating
juvenile offenders. 26 In contrast, the justice model advocates a

juvenile justice system which demands that young offenders

receive just punishment for their crimes against society. 27 This
debate has led to the enactment of the Children and Young
Persons Acts of 1933, 1963, and 1969 and the Criminal Justice

Id. The jurisdiction of the juvenile court included the disposition of
22.
children found begging, children living with unfit parents, and children
considered beyond parental control. Id.
No policymakers or commentators have expressly defined the "special
23.
needs" of children in a criminal justice system. However, these "special needs"
seem to include a more nurturing environment or an environment that is
conducive to a child's emotional and physical growth, while fostering a sense of
self-worth.
See TERRILL, supra note 2, at 77. The United States also recognizes
24.
that juvenile offenders can be rehabilitated. See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 538
F.2d 1072 (1976) (stating that the purpose of the United States juvenile
delinquency system is to rehabilitate, rather than to punish, and to reduce the
stigma of a criminal conviction).
TERRILL, supranote 2, at 77-78. Having recognized the different needs
25.
of children, the state also began to expand its intervention in children's lives to
non-criminal issues. Such intervention included state involvement with children
from single-parent homes, as well as involvement with orphans and victims of
child abuse. Id.
See generally ANDREW RUTHERFORD, CRIMINAL JUSICE AND THE
Id.
26.
PURSUIT OF DECENCY (1933) (arguing that humane values must be at the heart of
any criminal justice system).
TERRILL, supra note 2, at 79. See generally Caroline Ball, Young
27.
Offenders and the Youth Court, 1992 CRIM. L. REV. 277.
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Acts of 1982, 1988, and 1992,28 which reflect the dispute between
the two schools of thought. 29 Certain provisions in each Act
reflect the influence of the welfare model, while others reflect the
influence of the justice model. Commentators note that these
competing views have left the British juvenile justice system with
a "schizophrenic" personality.3 0
The rising crime rate among juveniles over the past several
decades and the high rate of juvenile recidivism have fueled the
debate over the justice and welfare models.3 1
Despite the
escalating crime rate in Great Britain, some commentators
continue to criticize the current juvenile system as unduly harsh
and ineffective. 32 One of the most controversial aspects of Great
Britain's criminal justice system is the relatively young age at
which the system deems an individual criminally responsible for
his or her actions. 33 The debate over the age of criminal
responsibility reached a climax with the recent conviction of two
eleven-year-old boys for the brutal murder of James Bulger, a
two-year-old toddler.3 4 The case heightened the debate in Great

28.
These Acts provide for the current juvenile criminal justice system of
Great Britain and are discussed in great detail throughout the Note. See infra
part ll.C.-D. and accompanying notes.
29.
TERRILL, supranote 2, at 79. See generally Ball, supra note 27, at 277.
30.
See Jenny McEwan, Legislation:a The Criminal Justice Act-Justice,
Welfare or Confusion?, 46 MOD. L. REV. 178, 184, 186-91 (1983). See generally
ALAN NORRIE, CRIME, REASON AND HISTORY: A CRMCAL INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINAL

LAW (1993) (providing a general discussion on the duality and contradictions in
criminal law). The dual nature of criminal law arises from notions of just
punishment and the realization that crime is both a political and a social
phenomenon. Consequently, most criminal justice systems reflect both the justice
and welfare models. Id.
31.
TERRILL, supra note 2, at 79.
See also Young Offenders, THE
ECONOMIST, May 7, 1994, at 65.
32.
See generally J.H. Godsland & N.G. Fielding, Persons Convicted of
Grave Crimes: The 1933 Children and Young PersonsAct (§ 53) and its Effect Upon
Children's Rights, 24 HOw. J. CRIM. JUST. 282 (1985). However, one study
conducted by the Dutch Ministry of Justice seems to suggest that Great Britain's
system of juvenile justice has lowered crime rates among young persons. The
study reports that England has considerably lower rates for violent offenses
among young offenders than the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, or Switzerland.
Juvenile Offenses Lower Than Many Countries in Western Europe, GUARDIAN
(London), July 6, 1994, at 2.
33.
Great Britain has the lowest age of criminal responsibility (age ten) of
any European state with the exception of Scotland, where the age of criminality is
eight HorrifyingPrecedents,IRISH TIMES (Dublin), November 25, 1993, at 9. See
generallyTERRILL, supranote 2.
34.
The case shocked readers around the world. Bill Schiller, Evil Freaks
of Nature Get Life for Murdering Tot, TORONTO STAR, November 25, 1993, at Al;
Malcom Holland, Gruesome Find on St. Valentine's Day Left Nation Stunned, S.
CHINA MORNING POST (Hong Kong), November 25, 1993, at 20.
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Britain over whether the welfare or justice model more effectively
combats juvenile violent crime, particularly among the very
young.
B. The Bulger Case

1. The Facts
On February 14, 1993, the corpse of a two-year-old boy,
James Bulger, was discovered on railway tracks in Liverpool,
England. 3 5 James Bulger's body had been savagely beaten and
left on the tracks where it had been sliced in half by a passing
train. 3 6 Dismay turned to disbelief when the police questioned

two ten-year-old boys and charged them with the kidnapping and
murder of James Bulger.3 7 The people of Liverpool and the
international community could not believe that boys of such a
young age could commit this brutal murder. Yet the investigation
of the murder left no doubt as to the identity of the killers.3 8 A
video camera captured Robert Thompson and John Venables 39
luring Bulger away from his mother in a local shopping mal. 40
The two boys then dragged the toddler two and one-half miles
across Liverpool to isolated railroad tracks, 4 1 where Thompson
and Venables literally tortured Bulger to death. 42 Bulger suffered
at least thirty blows, including two injuries to his head and
twenty to his body. The boys used a two-pound iron bar and
approximately twenty-seven bricks to inflict the injuries. Bulger
was left on the train tracks, where a train later sliced his body in
half.4

35.
36.
37.

Holland, supra, at 20.
Id.
Id. At the age of ten, both boys had reached the age of criminal

responsibility in Great Britain. They were the youngest to face a murder trial in
Great Britain in this century. 1d.
38.
See Steven Glover, A Story Devoid of Mercy and Hope, EVENING
STANDARD (London), November 25, 1993, at 18.
39.
Robert Thompson and John Venables were known as Child A and
Child B throughout the trial. Only after the court handed down the conviction
and sentence did the judge release their names to the press. See Locked Up at
11, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIBUNE, November 25, 1993, at 1A; Richard Meares, Two

Boys Found Guilty of Murdering Toddler in Northern England, Reuter Library
Reports, Nov. 24, 1993, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, Non-US File.
40.
Locked Up at 11, supra.

41.
42.
43.

Id. See also Glover, supra note 38.
Glover, supranote 38.
Id.
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2. The Verdict and the Sentence
A twenty-four day trial revealed the details of the brutal
murder."4 Justice Morland presided over the trial held in the
Crown Court. 45 The jury, consisting of nine men and three
women,1 6 deliberated for five and one-half hours before
determining that both Thompson and Venables were guilty of the
abduction and murder of Bulger. 4 7
Justice Morland then
sentenced Thompson and Venables to be detained at Her
Majesty's Pleasure, 48 an indeterminate sentence that may mean
49
life in prison.

The brutal murder of James Bulger intensified the debate
over juvenile justice in Great Britain, specifically with regard to
whether Great Britain should hold young children criminally
responsible for brutal acts such as murder. Public opinion in
Great Britain after the Bulger case supports this idea, but some
commentators claim that Great Britain's system does not provide
adequate protection for young offenders who may not understand
the consequences of their actions.5 0 The debate in Great Britain
ultimately raises the issue of whether a juvenile justice system
based on the justice model is more effective than one based on
the welfare model.

44.
1d.
45.
Id. The court moved the trial from Liverpool to Preston in order to
avoid mob violence, which broke out when the two boys were first arrested.
Meares, supra note 39.
The Crown Courts have exclusive jurisdiction over all major criminal cases,
including juvenile murder cases. TERRILL, supra note 2, at 28. See also infra
Appendix I (explaining the structure of the British court system).
46.
Glover, supranote 38.
47.
Meares, supra note 39. However, the jury failed to reach a verdict on
another charge that accused Thompson and Venables of trying unsuccessfully to
abduct another toddler before they abducted James Bulger. Schmidt, supranote
9.
48.
Her Majesty's Pleasure is a sentence for an indefinite term
automatically issued when a child or young person is convicted of murder. See
Schmidt, supranote 9, at A3. See also infrapart ll.C.3. and note 152.
49.
See John Edwards, Evil, Brutal and Cunning, DAILY MAIL (London),
November 25, 1993, at 1.

50.

See Margaret Lowrie, Why Do Children Kill Other Children, (Cable News

Network television broadcast, November 24, 1993) (transcript available in LEXIS,
News Library, Curnws File). Many commentators argued that children as young
as Thompson and Venables do not understand the concept of death and,
therefore, cannot fully understand the implications of their actions. Id. See also
John Passmore, Relief in the City Shamed by Two of Its Children, EVENING
STANDARD (London), November 25, 1993, at 3 (reporting the remarks of Albie
Conner, a forty-nine-year-old layperson, who said: "It was the only verdict wasn't
it? I mean at 10 years old the little bastards knew right from wrong.").
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The juvenile justice system that held Robert Thompson and
John Venables 6riminally liable as adults for the brutal murder of
James Bulger has undergone numerous modifications over the
past several decades. Although policymakers in Great Britain
have tinkered with the provisions in both the Criminal Justice
Acts and the Children and Young Persons Acts, legislators and
commentators still cannot agree on a system of juvenile justice.5 1
The Children and Young Persons Acts of 1933, 1963, and 1969,
and the Criminal Justice Acts of 1982, 1988, and 1991, are the
most significant statutory enactments addressing Great Britain's
administration of its juvenile criminal system.
Yet many
commentators contend that even with these amendments to the
Acts, Great Britain is no closer to an acceptable solution to
juvenile crime than it was sixty years ago.
C. The Welfare Model Reflected in GreatBritain's
Juvenile Justice Systen. The Childrenand Young Persons
Acts of 1933, 1963, and 1969
The enactment of the various Children and Young Persons
Acts (Act or Acts) facilitated the development of a comprehensive,
separate juvenile justice system in Great Britain.5 2 First, the Acts
raised the age of criminal responsibility, which is the age at which
a person becomes subject to the full penalties provided by the
criminal law. Second, the Acts established a hierarchy of criminal
capacity, which is the age at which a child is deemed capable of
committing a crime and, thus, becomes criminally responsible.
Finally, the Children and Young Persons Acts specifically provided
for the punishment of juveniles who commit certain grave crimes.
The Children and Young Persons Act of 1933 (1933 Act)
formally placed a duty on the juvenile courts to give first priority
to the welfare of the juvenile.5 3 Section 44 of the 1933 Act
mandates that all courts dealing with children and young persons

51.

workers.

Many commentators who advocate the welfare model are social

See TERRILL, supra note 2, at 79. The British Parliament is divided.

Michael Howard, the British Home Secretary, has vigorously advocated the justice
model since he came to office. The justice model also garners the support of
much of the Tory Party. However, some Tories, as well as the Labour and Liberal
Democratic Parties, support more of a welfare model. Neil Darbyshire, What a
Week that was for Harassed Home Secretary: Another Day, Another Crisis in the
Life of Tories' Law and DisorderPlan, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Sept. 30, 1994,
at 8. See generally Young Offenders, supra note 31.
52.
See TERRILL, supranote 2, at 78-79.
53.
The Children and Young Persons Act of 1933 was seen as "child care"
legislation because it addressed the child criminal's welfare as well as his or her
accountability to the justice system.
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"shall have regard to the welfare of the child."54 Because the
courts should punish young offenders only when it serves the

offender's best interests, the juvenile courts cannot mete out
punishment for the sole purpose of retribution. s
Thus, the
courts are required to consider the best interests of the child even
when convicting and sentencing for a serious crime.
1. The Age of Criminal Responsibility
The British Parliament used the Children and Young Persons
Acts to raise the age of criminal responsibility. At common law,
the age of criminal responsibility was seven.5 6 The 1933 Act
57
raised the age of criminal responsibility to eight years of age.
The Children and Young Persons Act of 1963 (1963 Act)
subsequently raised the age of criminal responsibility to ten.5 8
2. The Categories of Criminal Capacity
Because Parliament believed that the age of ten was still a
relatively low age to become criminally responsible, the Children
and Young Persons Acts, as interpreted through British case law,
also established categories of criminal capacity.5 9 The categories
provide that, depending on the age of the offender, the
prosecution may be required to satisfy a heightened burden of
proof before certain child offenders can be found criminally
responsible. The British courts define three categories of criminal
capacity: children under the age of ten who cannot be held
criminally responsible; children between the ages of ten and

fourteen for whom the prosecution must meet a heightened
burden of proof before they can be held criminally responsible;

54.
Children and Young Persons Act, 1933, 23 Geo. 5, ch. 12, § 44 (Eng.)
[hereinafter 1933 CYPA].
55.
See generally Glanville L. Williams, The Criminal Responsibility of
Children, 1954 CRIM. L. REV. 493, 495.
56.
See WILSON, supra note 11, at 12.
57.
1933 CYPA § 50.
58.
Children and Young Persons Act, 1963, ch. 37, § 6 (Eng.) [hereinafter
1963 CYPA]. There was a feeling in Great Britain that the age of eight was too
young to hold a child criminally responsible. However, the Ingleby Committee
pointed out that while the correct age of criminal responsibility is difficult to
determine, it certainly is higher than eight. The Ingleby Committee suggested
raising the minimum age of criminal responsibility from ten to twelve. See J.C.
SMiTH & BRIAN HOGAN, CRIMINAL LAW 189 n.7 (7th ed. 1992).
59.
Great Britain has one of the lowest ages of criminal responsibility of
any state. See supranote 33 and infra note 296.
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and children between the ages of fourteen and eighteen for whom
the prosecution bears no additional burden of proof.
a. Children Under the Age of Ten
The first category of child offenders, those under the age of

ten, cannot be held criminally responsible.60

There is a

conclusive presumption that the child is doli incapaxa6 l Thus,
when a child is under the age of ten, that child is entirely exempt
from criminal responsibility under all circumstances. 6 2 Even if
there is uncontested evidence that a child under the age of ten
committed a criminal act with the appropriate criminal intent, or
mens rea,63 a court cannot convict the child if he or she has not
attained the age of ten at the time of the criminal act. 6 4 This rule
is not merely a procedural bar.65 The effect of the rule is that a
child under the age
of ten cannot commit a crime, even if the act
66
itself is criminal.
Walters v. Lunt provides an example of how a child under the
In Walters, the police
age of ten cannot commit a crime. 67
charged a husband and wife with knowingly receiving a stolen
tricycle.
However, their seven-year-old son had stolen the
tricycle. The court held that the parents must be acquitted
because the child was under the age of criminal responsibility;
therefore, the child could not commit the crime of theft, even
though the child did steal the tricycle. Therefore, the court could
68
not convict the parents of knowingly receiving a stolen tricycle.

SMITH & HOGAN, supranote 58, at 188-89.
60.
61.
Id.
Id. at 188.
62.
63.
Mens rea is defined as criminal intent or a guilty or wrongful purpose.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 985 (6th ed. 1990).
SMITH & HOGAN, supranote 58, at 189.
64.

65.
A child is not merely immune from prosecution for any crime
committed while under the age of ten, but is considered not to have committed a
crime at all. Thus, if another person over the age often induced a child under the
age often to commit a crime, the older person is the one found to have committed
the principal crime because the law views the younger person as not having

committed the act. Id.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
Walters v. Lunt, [1951] 2 All E.R. 645.
Id. See also Marsh v. Loader, [1863] 14 C.B.N.S. 555. The definition of

legal guilt is the willful commission of an act in violation of the law. However, a
court may excuse willful commission of a crime if the person committing the
crime has a defect. The court may consider the age of a child such a defect. Id.
at 556.
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b. Children Between the Ages of Ten and Fourteen
Although a child between the ages of ten and fourteen can be
held criminally responsible for his actions, the prosecution must
satisfy a heightened burden of proof before a court will convict a
child in this second category. 6 9 This heightened burden of proof

serves as one of the safeguards built into the juvenile justice
system, although it is not codified in the Children and Young
Persons Acts.
The British courts recognize a rebuttable
presumption that children between the ages of ten and fourteen
cannot distinguish between right and wrong and, thus, are
incapable of committing a crime. 70
To overcome this
presumption, the prosecution must prove not only that the child
committed a criminal act with the required mens rea, but also
that the child committed the criminal act with "mischievous
discretion." 7 1 Mischievous discretion is defied as a child's ability
72
to understand the difference between right and wrong.
In Rex v. Gorrie,73 the Central Criminal Court provided a
modem test for mischievous discretion. Gorrie, a thirteen-yearold boy, was charged with manslaughter after a fellow student
died from an infection, which he received from a slight injury
inflicted by Gorrie's penknife. 74 The court instructed the jury that
the prosecution bore the burden of showing that when the boy
injured his classmate, he knew his actions were gravely and
seriously wrong. 7 5 First, the jury considered whether Gorrie had
the appropriate criminal intent for manslaughter-whether Gorrie
intentionally stabbed the other boy with his penknife. 7 6 Second,
the jury considered whether the teenager also had the requisite
mischievous discretion-whether Gorrie knew that stabbing his
schoolmate was gravely wrong. 7 7
The jury acquitted Gorrie
because the stabbing occurred during horseplay, and Gorrie had
no idea that his actions were grossly wrong.
Although the heightened burden of proof ensures that a court

can convict only those children between the ages of ten and
fourteen having the appropriate mens rea and mischievous
discretion, the prosecution has many ways to rebut the

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

SMITH & HOGAN, supra note 58, at 189.
Id.
Id.
Id. at nn.12-13.
Rex v. Gorrie, [1919] 83 J.P. 136 (1918).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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presumption of incapacity. The prosecution may submit evidence
of the child's behavior, both before and after the crime, to show
that the child possessed the requisite mens rea 7 8 Fleeing the
scene of the crime, however, is not sufficient evidence to rebut the
presumption. 7 9 Likewise, the mere fact that a crime has been
committed is not sufficient to rebut the presumption of
incapacity. 80
The prosecution may also submit evidence of the defendant's
background, education, emotional development, and previous
convictions if the court finds such evidence relevant.8 1 The fact
that the child committed an act that any normal child of the

defendant's age would know is wrong is not sufficient to rebut the

presumption of incapacity.8 2 The prosecution must also establish
that the defendant is normal for his or her age and personally
knew the act was wrong. 83 The court has broad discretion to
admit evidence that it determines to be relevant.
A court may conclude that all the evidence taken together
establishes mischievous discretion. In J.M. v. Runeckles, the
criminal appeals division of the Queen's Bench held that the
prosecution successfully rebutted the presumption of incapacity
by presenting a series of factors. In Runeckles, a thirteen-yearold girl attacked and stabbed another girl with a broken milk
bottle. 84 The prosecution offered evidence of the type of act she
committed, the fact that the defendant fled the scene and hid
from the police, and the content and handwriting of her statement
in which she described the incident.8 5 The court concluded that
all of the evidence taken together tended to establish that the girl
was of normal intelligence and appreciated the seriousness of her
86
actions; therefore, she had the requisite mischievous discretion.

78.
SMITH & HOGAN, supra note 58, at 190.
79.
Id.
80.
See Queen v. Smith, [1845] 1 C.L.C. 260 (malicious intent cannot be
presumed from mere commission of a criminal act); Rex v. Kershaw, [1902] 28
T.L.R. 357, 358 (commission of a crime itself is not evidence of a guilty state of

mind).
81.

See R v. B, R v. A, [1979] 3 All E.R. 460 (a court may permit the

prosecution to introduce any evidence to rebut the presumption of incapacity of
intent as long as the court finds it relevant to the issue of the child's capacity to
know good from evil).
82.
JBH and JH (Minors) v. O'Connell [1981] Crim. L. Rep. 632, IPH v.

Chief Constable of South Wales, [1987] Crim. L. Rep. 42.
83.
SMIH & HOGAN, supranote 58, at 189-90.
84.

[1984] 79 Cr. App. 255 (Q.B. Divl Ct.).

85.
Id. at 260.
86.
Id. See also Kershaw, [1902] 18 T.L.R. at 357-58 (a jury found a
thirteen-year-old boy guilty of manslaughter and found mischievous discretion
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Even with these avenues open to the prosecution, however, other
cases illustrate that proving younger children possess
mischievous discretion is especially difficult.8 7
c. Children Between the Ages of Fourteen and Eighteen
The third category of criminal responsibility applies to
children between the ages of fourteen and eighteen. Because the

system assumes that children of this age understand the
consequences of their actions, a juvenile over the age of fourteen
is not entitled to a presumption of incapacity. Instead, the law
presumes such juveniles are fully responsible for their criminal
actions.8 8 The prosecution need only prove the usual actus reus
and mens rea required to prove criminal responsibility in the case
of an adult offender.8 9 Thus, a child over the age of fourteen is
presumed to be "responsible for his actions entirely as if he were
forty."9 0

3. The Punishment of Juveniles Guilty of "Grave Crimes"
Since the passage of the 1961 Criminal Justice Act, Section
53 of the Children and Young Persons Act of 1933 provides for the
punishment of juveniles who commit certain "grave crimes."91
The British Parliament initially enacted Section 53 to protect
society from a small number of dangerous juveniles, while
providing a more humane solution to the crime than the death
penalty. 92 In its original form, Section 53 provided that if a child
is convicted of murder, attempted murder, manslaughter, or
wounding with the intent to do grievous bodily harm, and the
court determines that no other punishment would be suitable, the
court could sentence the offender to be detained for a specified
from evidence of the nature of the crime as well as the defendant's statements to
the authorities).
87.
SMITH & HOGAN, supra note 58, at 190. The Ingleby Committee,
however, recommended the abolishment of the presumption that a child between
the ages of ten and fourteen is incapable of committing a crime. Some
commentators argue that the presumption causes an anomalous result to the

extent that the more warped a child's moral development, the safer he is from

treatment under the law. Id. The Ingleby Committee also studied evidence that
the courts have difficulty in applying the presumption and therefore require
different levels of proof, leading to an inconsistent application of the law. The
Committee's recommendation has not yet been implemented. Id.
88.
SMTH& HOGAN,supra note 58, at 191.
89.
Id.
90.
See Queen v. Smith, [1845] 1 C.L.C. 260.
91.
1933 CYPA § 53.
92.
1933 CYPA § 53(1). See Godsland &Fielding, supranote 32, at 286.
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period; the court was not permitted to sentence the child to
death.9 3 The Criminal Justice Act of 1961, however, increased
the scope of offenses punishable under Section 53(2) of the
Children and Young Persons Act of 1933 to include all offenses for
which an adult convicted on indictment could be sentenced to
imprisonment for at least fourteen years.9 4 In addition to setting
the punishment for grave crimes, Section 53 also provides that
juveniles charged with offenses covered by its provisions may be
tried in the Crown Court-a court that tries adult
offenders-instead of the juvenile court. 95
Section 53 provides that the Crown Court may sentence
to custody indefinitely if they are convicted of
young offenders
"grave crimes." 96 There are two types of grave crimes: (1) murder,
and (2) those indictable offenses for which an adult may be
sentenced to imprisonment for fourteen years or more. 9 7 If a
young offender is convicted of either of these types of crimes, the
Crown Court will sentence the offender pursuant to Section 53.98
Section 53 distinguishes offenders between the ages of ten

and eighteen who are convicted of murder from offenders between
the ages of fourteen and seventeen who are convicted of an
indictable offense. The first part of Section 53 states that a

93.
Godsland & Fielding, supra note 32, at 286. The substance of the
original Section 53, currently is found at 1933 CYPA § 53(2).
The Criminal Justice Act of 1961 amended Section 53 of the Children
94.
and Young Persons Act of 1933 to include: "any offence punishable in the case of
an adult with imprisonment for fourteen years or more, not being an offence the
sentence for which is fixed by law." Criminal Justice Act, 1961, 9 & 10 Eliz. 2,
ch. 39, § 2(1) (Eng.).
See infra Appendix I.
95.
Godsland & Fielding, supranote 32, at 282.
96.
Id. at 283.
97.
Great Britain's Juvenile Court has original jurisdiction over all criminal
98.
offenses committed by persons under the age of seventeen, with the exception of
murder. TERRILL, supranote 2, at 80. The Crown Court has exclusive jurisdiction
over all proceedings on indictment, including serious crimes committed by adults
and homicide committed by both adults and children. Id. at 29. See Supreme
Court Act 1981, § 1(1) (Eng.). However, the Juvenile Court may transfer a
criminal case to the Crown Court. Generally, such a transfer is made:
(1) [i]f a young person is charged with a serious crime and the court is of
the opinion that he should be founl guilty, the court may take the position
that the offender should be sentenced to a long term of detention, which
only a Crown court has the power to impose; [or] (2) [i]f a young person is
charged in conjunction with an adult for an indictable offense, the juvenile
court may transfer the case to a Crown court in the interest ofjustice.
TERRILL, supra note 2, at 81 (emphasis added). Magistrates' Courts Act, 1980, §
24(1)(a), (1)(b) (as amended by the Criminal Justice Act of 1991 § 68, sched. 8,
para. 6(1)(a) [hereinafter Magistrates' Courts Act].
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person found guilty of murder, committed while that person was
between the ages of ten and eighteen, will be sentenced to
detention during Her Majesty's Pleasure. 9 9 The duration of the
term of imprisonment is indeterminate, in such a place and under
The
such conditions as the Home Secretary may direct.100
imposition of the sentence is automatic upon a verdict of guilty on
an indictment for murder, and a judge has no discretion to
impose a lower sentence because of mitigating factors. Thus, all
children between the ages of ten and eighteen are sentenced to
detention at Her Majesty's Pleasure upon a conviction of
0
murder.' '
The second part of Section 53 provides that the punishment
for all juvenile offenders between the ages of fourteen and
seventeen, who are convicted of an indictable offense punishable
in the case of an adult by a term of imprisonment of fourteen
years or more, is detention in such a place and under such
conditions as the Home Secretary may direct.10 2 Such indictable
offenses include attempted murder, manslaughter, rape,
10 3
wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm, and robbery.
Juveniles under the age of fourteen come within the scope of
Section 53 only when they are tried on indictment. However, for
juveniles under fourteen, the only indictable offenses besides
murder are crimes for which the juvenile is charged jointly with
an adult.Y14 Regardless of the juvenile offender's age, a court may
order detention under Section 53 only if it determines that no
other sentence is suitable.' 0 s The period of detention, which may
be for life, must be specified in the sentence and cannot exceed
the maximum term of imprisonment for which the offense is
punishable in the case of an adult. 106
Although Section 53 seems extremely harsh, most juvenile
offenders cannot or will not be tried and convicted under this
section. If a juvenile is under the age of fourteen, Section 53
applies only if the juvenile is charged with murder or charged

99.
100.

1933 CYPA § 53(1).
Id. § 53(2). The Home Secretary is the British Minister responsible for,

interalia, the administration of the criminal justice system.
101.
under the
102.
103.

See supra part lI.C.2.a. (discussing the legal incapacity of children
age often to commit crimes).
1933 CPYA § 53(2).
See Godsland & Fielding, supranote 32, at 283-84.

104. Id. at 289.
105. 1933 CYPA § 53(2). Children who commit such indictable offenses
may also be sentenced by a juvenile court to a term in a young offenders
institution and to community service. See infra part III.F.
106. 1933 CYPA § 53(2).
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jointly with an adult.'1 7 Thus, Section 53 applies to few juveniles
under the age of fourteen. Additionally, Section 53 is restricted in
its application to juveniles over the age of fourteen. Section 53
applies to such juveniles only when they have committed mufrder
or an indictable offense punishable by imprisonment for fourteen
years or more, such as manslaughter, robbery, or rape.1 0 8 Even
these juveniles, however, will only be sentenced under Section 53
if no other punishment is suitable.1 0 9 Therefore, the harshness of
Section 53 is tempered by its limited applicability.
Despite its narrow scope, Section 53 is probably the most
controversial provision in the Children and Young Persons Acts, if
not in the British juvenile justice system as a whole. First,
commentators criticize the Crown Court's recent application of
Section 53 as following the justice model, thereby departing from
the stated goal of the Children and Young Persons Acts to serve
the special needs of juvenile offenders by adhering to the welfare

model.110 Because the courts rarely used Section 53 before the
mid-1960s, this criticism focuses on the courts use of the
provision since that time."' Moreover, commentators also note
that the increased use of this Section to sentence juveniles
reflects purely retributive sentencing and the increasing
dominance of the justice model in the reasoning of the courts.
Second, commentators criticize the 1961 Criminal Justice
Act's amendment to Section 53, which extends its coverage 1 to
"grave crimes" committed by a juvenile aged fourteen or older. 12
This extension includes all offenses that could lead to a sentence
of imprisonment for fourteen years or more if committed by an
adult. The amendment expands the scope of Section 53 to cover
a wide range of offenses in addition to murder and manslaughter,
1 13
This
including robbery, arson, and serious sexual offenses.
amendment also links the juvenile system with the adult criminal

1933 CYPA §§ 53(1), (2). See supra note 98 (regarding juveniles
107.
charged jointly with adults); Godsland & Fielding, supra note 32, at 284.
However, commentators criticize the harshness of Section 53 for including
offenders under the age of fourteen simply because they are charged jointly with
an adult. Given the welfare goal of the juvenile system, a juvenile charged jointly
with an adult should not be held more culpable than when acting alone. Id. at
289-90. This perverse result illustrates yet another problem arising from the
merger of the adult and juvenile sentencing schemes.
1933 CYPA § 53(2).
108.
Magistrates' Courts Act § 24(1).
109.
See generally Godsland & Fielding, supranote 32.
110.
Id. at 284-96.
111.
Id. at 286-87. Prior to the 1961 Criminal Justice Act, Section 53 only
112.
applied to children convicted of murder, manslaughter, or wounding with the
intent to do grievous bodily harm. See supratext accompanying notes 93-94.

113.

Id.
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system, contravening the Children and Young Persons Acts goal
of creating a separate system of juvenile justice. 11 4 Additionally,
the amendment ensures that any increase in the courts' power to
impose sentences of fourteen years or more for other adult
offenses would also apply to young offenders.' 15 Thus, because
Section 53 joins the adult and juvenile sentencing schemes,
commentators suggest that Section 53 has a greater chance of
being used by the juvenile courts as a means of punishment
16
beyond the Section's aim of rehabilitating juvenile offenders. 1
Given the Children and Young Persons Acts stated goal of
providing for the welfare of juvenile offenders, criticism of the
courts retributive application of the law led Parliament to enact
the Children and Young Persons Act of 1969 (1969 Act). 11 7 The
stated intention of the 1969 Act was to reduce the number of
criminal proceedings that could be initiated against children.
This Act was supposed to be the rebirth and ultimate triumph of
1 18
the welfare model in the British juvenile justice system.
However, the main provisions of the Act that reflect the welfare
model have not been brought into force.1 19

114. Id.
115. Id. More juveniles would be tried before the Crown Court because, in
essence, Section 53 provides that juveniles charged with the offenses covered by
its provisions will be tried in the adult courts of Great Britain, instead of the
juvenile court. See supra note 98. See also infra Appendix I.
116. Godsland & Fielding, supra note 32, at 286-87. One article has
studied the actual increase in the use of Section 53 by the courts. The study
showed that the total number of juveniles sentenced under Section 53 rose from
six in 1966 to ninety-two in 1981. The authors speculate that the courts use
Section 53 to meet the need of society and the courts to punish, rather than to
protect society from dangerous juveniles. Id. at 285-87. However, the authors do
not correlate these statistics with other statistics showing the overall increase in
juvenile crime, especially violent crime, in Great Britain. Nor do the authors
address the issue of whether the welfare model of juvenile justice and the notion
of rehabilitation are misplaced when addressing dangerous juveniles in today's
society.
117. Children and Young Persons Act, 1969, ch. 54 (Eng.) [hereinafter 1969
CYPA].
118. See SMiTH & HOGAN, supra note 58, at 191. See also Ball, supra note
27, at 279. The enactment of the 1969 Act showed a new commitment to the
welfare model ofjuvenile justice, which views juvenile delinquency and crime as a
manifestation of a deprivation that society has a responsibility to treat. See id. at
280.
119. In the United Kingdom, all legislation must contain express
commencement provisions before its operation as a law begins. Commencement

provisions specify the date on which the legislation comes into force.

The

commencement of many modem statutes is expressly postponed, empowering the
Queen or a specified Minister of the Crown to designate a future date.
Interpretation Act, 1978, ch. 30, § 4 (Eng.). The 1969 Act has no specified
commencement date. Instead, the Secretary of State was empowered to order
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The 1969 Act contains significant provisions advancing the
welfare model of juvenile justice, but currently they have no
influence on the British juvenile justice system because they are
not in force. The first significant provision in the 1969 Act
provides that criminal proceedings will only be brought against
children as a last resort. In the case of a child under fourteen
years of age, criminal proceedings would be completely
Additionally,
eliminated, except in the case of homicide. 120
Parliament intended the 1969 Act to raise the minimum age of

criminal responsibility in stages, further reducing the number of
children subject to court proceedings. However, these provisions
are unlikely to be brought into force anytime in the near
future. 12 1 If brought into force, these two provisions would
substantially reduce the number of criminal proceedings initiated
against children.
In addition to reducing the number of proceedings against
young offenders, the 1969 Act provides for further restrictions on
the prosecution of children over the age of fourteen. 122 The 1969
Act would restrict the right to prosecute these young persons to
"qualified informants," defined in the Act as servants of the
Crown, police officers, members of a designated police force, or
local authorities. 123 Subject to regulations to be promulgated by
the Home Secretary, these qualified informants would be the only
12 4
persons able to institute proceedings against young offenders.
Additionally, these court proceedings would only be available
when the qualified informant was of the opinion that the case
could not otherwise be adequately addressed.1 2 s Specifically, the
qualified informant could not institute proceedings against the
young offender if the case could be sufficiently handled by a
parent, a teacher, or other non-custodial means through the
exercise of a local authority. However, this provision is currently

commencement dates for the various provisions of the 1969 Act. 1969 CYPA §
73(2).
120. Section 4 of the 1969 Act provides that "[a] person shall not be charged
with an offense, except homicide, by reason of anything done or omitted while he
was a child." "Child" is defined as a person under the age of fourteen. 1969

CYPA § 4.
121. SMM & HOGAN, supra note 58, at 191. If Section 4 were fully
implemented, children aged ten to fourteen still could be held capable of
committing a crime, but they could not be liable to prosecution, with the
exception of the crime of murder. Id.
122. See 1969 CYPA § 5.
123. SMnI & HOGAN, supranote 58, at 191-92; 1969 CYPA § 5(9).
However, no such regulations have been
124. 1969 CYPA § 5(1).
promulgated because the provision is not in force.
125. 1969 CYPA § 5(2); SMITH & HOGAN, supra note 58, at 191-92.
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not in force, and Parliament has no intention of bringing it into
force at the present time.1 2 6 Because the qualified informant
provision is not in force, which individuals would constitute
qualified informants is unclear. Likewise, whether the Home
Secretary would enact regulations either limiting or further

specifying the cases in which a qualified informant could initiate
proceedings against a juvenile offender is also uncertain.
Although the drafters of the 1969 Act designed it to promote
the welfare of juvenile offenders, the Act fails to address the
controversial Section 53 of the 1933 Act. Section 53 received little
attention from Parliament in the initial inquiries preceding its
enactment of the 1969 Act for two reasons. First, in 1969 only six
juvenile offenders were convicted and sentenced under Section
53;127 thus, there was little concern about its misapplication.
Second, in 1968 Mary Bell, an eleven-year-old girl, was convicted
of a brutal manslaughter. 128 Bell's brutal crime provided further
proof of the necessity of Section 53 to deal with the extremely
violent crimes of young offenders. Bell's conviction and sentence
under Section 53 attracted considerable publicity and was
generally considered well deserved. Thus, the case also may have
influenced Parliament's decision to retain Section 53.129
D. The Justice Model Reflected in GreatBritain'sJuvenile Justice
System: The Criteriafor Imposing CustodialSentences Under the
CriminalJustice Act of 1991
The purpose of the Criminal Justice Act of 1991 (1991
Justice Act)13 ° was to regulate the use of all custodial sentences
imposed by the British courts.' 3 1 Under the British criminal
justice system, a court may impose three types of custodial

126.
SMrIH & HOGAN, supranote 58, at 191. See also Ball, supranote 27, at
279.
Parliament only partially implemented the 1969 Act because the
Conservatives came to power with very little sympathy for the welfare provisions
in the Act. Additionally, the high recidivism rate (75-80%) of young offenders

after release from community homes and other rehabilitative sentences gave the
public little confidence in the measures of the 1969 Act. See id.
127.
Godsland & Fielding, supranote 32, at 285.
128.
See id. at 287. Mary Bell strangled two young boys, ages two and four,
in the span of two weeks in 1968. School-Age Killers Can Regain Freedom, TIMES
(London), November 25, 1993.
129. Mary Bell was released in 1980 after spending twelve years in various
facilities for young offenders. She later changed her identity and lives in England
with a family of her own. See Schmidt, supranote 9.
130.
Criminal Justice Act, 1991, ch. 53 (Eng.) [hereinafter 1991 CJA].
131.
See generally D.A. Thomas, Criminal Justice Act 1991(1) Custodial
Sentences, 1992 CRIM. L. REV. 232.
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imprisonment, detention in a young
sentences on juveniles:
offenders institution, and detention under Section 53 of the
Children and Young Persons Act of 1933. Different views have
emerged regarding the enactment of the 1991 Justice Act. Some
commentators characterize the 1991 Justice Act as an important
milestone in the history of British sentencing. Others view it as
inconsequential to the sentencing system because it merely
132
reinforces current sentencing practices by the British courts.
Still others criticize the 1991 Justice Act because its sentencing
guidelines merely restate the judicial practice of "just deserts,"
which conforms to the justice model's prescription for sentencing
young offenders.133 This final view is valid insofar as the 1991
the imposition of
Justice Act does not significantly 13reduce
4
custodial sentences or their duration.
Nevertheless, the 1991 Justice Act does contain several
important procedural changes that differ from earlier Criminal
Justice Acts.' 3 5 As a whole, these Acts detail the sentencing
structure of the entire criminal justice system. The Justice Acts
develop two separate sentencing schemes-custodial and noncustodial. 13 6 The main thrust of the changes enacted by the 1991
Justice Act affect the statutory criteria for the imposition of the
various custodial sentences set forth in earlier Criminal Justice
Acts.
The Criminal Justice Act of 1991 differs from its predecessors
in one significant respect: its sentencing provisions follow a more

132.

Id.

133. Id. These criticisms of the Criminal Justice Act of 1991 reflect support
for the welfare model of juvenile justice and opposition to the prevalent use of the
justice model in the 1991 Act. However, other commentators who support the
justice model are not satisfied with the 1991 Act and criticize the sentencing
procedures for juveniles set forth in the Act as following the welfare model too
closely. See generallyid.
Id.
134.
See generally id.
135.
Id. Because this Note focuses on the effects of Great Britain's juvenile
136.
justice system on young offenders who commit violent crimes, the discussion is
limited to custodial sentencing. Parliament developed non-custodial sentences on
the theory that if more offenders are "punished" by the community, it will lead to
a reduction in custodial sentences. The approach of non-custodial sentencing
encompasses three ideas. First, politically, and thus legislatively, the government

needs to ensure that non-custodial sentences are tough and rigorously enforced.
Second, the government needs to promote non-custodial sentences as forms of
community punishment, restrictive of the young offenders' liberty in their own
way. Third, non-custodial sentences should also reflect the principle of
proportionality, with a graduated restriction on liberty in proportion to the
seriousness of, the offense and the particular offender. See generally Andrew
Ashworth, Non-CustodialSentences, 1992 CRIM. L. REV. 242,243.
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coherent theme, with proportionality as the leading principle. 137
The principle of proportionality requires a direct correlation
between the crime and the sentence imposed. The 1991 Justice
Act requires courts to base the offender's sentence on society's
idea of the punishment deserved for the crime committed;
however, it specifically prohibits the courts from lengthening
sentences for retributive or even rehabilitative purposes. 138 This
prohibition suggests that while the 1991 Justice Act is closer to
the justice model than earlier versions of the Act, the welfare
model has not been totally abandoned. 13 9 In fact, Parliament
intended the principle of proportionality to reduce the courts' use
of custodial sentences purely as a sanction and to encourage
greater resort to non-custodial sentences. 140 The principle of
proportionality seems to be a compromise within the juvenile
justice system between the justice and welfare models. 141
The principle of proportionality also proscribes juvenile
courts from imposing any custodial sentences on young offenders
who commit non-serious offenses. Juveniles who commit serious
offenses, however, still receive longer custodial sentences. 142 The

principle of proportionality embodies the theory that the parents
of young offenders, as well as society as a whole, have an equal
responsibility with the courts to curb the criminal behavior of
children. 14
Thus, the imposition of more non-custodial

sentences forces society and parents to take more responsibility
for the development and discipline of their children.144 However,

137. Ashworth, supra, at 243. See also Editor'sRemarks, 1992 CRIM. LAW
REV. 229 [hereinafter Editor's Remarks]. Although the 1991 Act is criticized
because its theme is not readily apparent from the wording of the legislation, one
can infer a theme and support it with other statutes and documents. Id.
138. Editor's Remarks, supra, at 229. However, there are exceptions for
"public protection" sentences. Id.
139. See id.
140. See id. at 229-30. However, in more recent years, British courts have
shown a strong tendency toward the issuance of custodial sentences, even for less
serious offenses. The number of people in prison serving custodial sentences for
longer than four years has risen from 6,077 in 1984 to 12,178 in 1990. Id. at
229.
141. Id.
142. Id. This policy goes against the principles of proportionality and "truth
in sentencing," both of which assume that every part of a custodial sentence
handed down should have some "meaning." Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. The most important aspect of the non-custodial sentencing scheme
in the Criminal Justice Act of 1991 is the development and clarification of the
.community sentence." Community sentences include probation, community
service, combination orders (probation plus community service), curfew,
supervision orders, and attendance center orders. The last two are only relevant
for young offenders. See generally Ashworth, supranote 136, at 242-49.
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rising violent crime rates and the high rate of recidivism among
juveniles have dampened Great Britain's enthusiasm for noncustodial sentences and non-retributive punishment.
In addition to introducing the principle of proportionality, the
Criminal Justice Act of 1991 also implements various longcampaigned-for changes in the Criminal Justice Act of 1982.145
First, the 1991 Justice Act equalizes the imposition of sentences
on male and female young offenders. 146 Second, it raises the
minimum age for confinement to a young offenders institution to
fifteen years of age.147
In raising the minimum age for
confinement to fifteen, this provision effectively abolishes all
custodial sentences for any offender fourteen years of age or
younger, unless the offender is convicted under Section 53 of the
Children and Young Persons Act of 1933.148 Third, the 1991
Criminal Justice Act changed the name of the juvenile court to
the "Youth Court." Parliament viewed the new name as more
representative of the purposes of the juvenile court, namely, to
protect and care for troubled youth and to sentence juvenile

offenders. 149
Although the 1991 Criminal Justice Act emphasizes the
justice model in most of its provisions, it also reflects the
principles of the welfare model. Specifically, the 1991 Justice Act
manifests the welfare model by providing courts with more
options for sentencing seventeen-year-old offenders. Under prior
Justice Acts, the courts treated offenders aged seventeen as
adults. The 1991 Justice Act, however, brought the seventeenyear-old offender within the protection of the juvenile system,
which requires the court to give first priority to the welfare of
young offenders. 150
Thus, the 1991 Justice Act brings the
seventeen-year-old offender under the greater protection of the
Youth Court.' 5 '
In general, the most important changes made by the 1991
Justice Act affect all custodial sentences, regardless of the age of

145. Id. Criminal Justice Act, 1982, ch. 48 (Eng.) [hereinafter 1982 CJA].
146.
SeeThomas, supra note 131, at 232-33.
147.
1991 CJA (amending part I of 1982 CJA).
See generally JAMES
MORTON, THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACTS OF 1987 AND 1988: A COMMEMTARY (1988);
Thomas, supranote 131, at 236-37 (detailing the influence of age thresholds).
148.
See discussion suprapart 1.C.3.
149.
See generallyBall, supra note 27.
150.
1991 CJA § 63(5). As a result, the maximum youth custody sentence

for seventeen-year-olds was reduced to twelve months. This provision places the
treatment of all young offenders aged seventeen in the hands of the juvenile
courts, unless they are charged with committing a grave crime under Section 53
of the Children and Young Persons Act of 1933.

151.

Id. See also 1933 CYPA § 44.
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the offender.1-52 The 1991 Justice Act abolishes the previous
statutory criteria set forth in the Criminal Justice Act of 1982,
which only governed the imposition of detention sentences in
young offenders institutions. 153 The old statutory criteria has
been replaced with three new criteria that restrict the courts' use
of all types of custodial sentences-imprisonment, detention in a
young offenders institution, and detention under Section 53 of the
1933 Act. 1s 4 Under the 1991 Justice Act, a court may impose a
custodial sentence if any of the.following criteria is present in a
particular case: (1) the offense is serious enough that only a
custodial sentence is justified; (2) the offense is of a violent or
sexual nature and the court determines that a custodial sentence
is necessary to protect the public from danger; or (3) an offender
refuses to serve a previously ordered community sentence. The
1991 Justice Act provides that a court may impose a custodial
sentence if it decides that any one of the three new criteria applies
to a particular offender's case. Moreover, the 1991 Justice Act
requires the court to state, in open court, the specific criterion
under which it is imposing the custodial sentence and the reason
the specific criterion is fulfilled.1 5 5 The court must then explain
the reasoning behind
the custodial sentence to the offender in
15 6
ordinary language.

152. See Thomas, supra note 131, at 232-33. The Criminal Justice Act of
1991 applies whenever a court convicts an offender of an offense punishable by a
discretionary custodial sentence, which includes most criminal offenses; however,
this Act does not apply to murder, which carries a mandatory life sentence for
adults and an automatic sentence to be detained at Her Majesty's Pleasure for
young offenders. Id. at 235. 1991 CJA § 1. The Criminal Justice Act of 1961
amended Section 53 of the Children and Young Persons Act of 1933 to cover
indictable offenses punishable by imprisonment for fourteen years or more in the
case of an adult. However, the amendment specifically excluded offenses for
which the sentence is "fixed by law." 1933 CYPA § 53. This exclusion applies to
persons convicted of murder because a sentence of life imprisonment is
mandatory for this offense under the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act,
1965, § 5.1(1), ch. 71 (Eng.).
153. 1982 CJA § 1(4)(a). See generally R v. Davidson [1990] 2 All E.R. 976
(1989) (applying CJA 1982 § 1(4)(a) in sentencing a young offender who was
convicted of eight separate offenses of burglary).
154. 1991 CJA §§ 1(2)-(3).
155. Id. §§ 1(4)(a)-(b). See generallyThomas, supra note 131, at 233.
156. 1991 CJA §§ 1(9)(a)-(b).
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1. The "Seriousness" of the Offense
The first criterion set forth under the 1991 Justice Act is the
"seriousness" of the offense. 157 The Act provides that a custodial
sentence may not be imposed unless the court is "of the opinion
that... the offence, or the combination of the offence and one
other offence associated with it, was so serious that only such a

sentence can be justified for the offence." 5 8 Therefore, under the
1991 Justice Act, the judgment of whether an offense is serious is
determined solely by the court.

The 1991 Justice Act essentially

maintains the seriousness requirement originally found in the
1982 version of the Act with an important modification-the
court's opinion determines seriousness, rather than leaving the
1 59

term open to any interpretation.
A major difference between the 1991 Justice Act and the
1982 Justice Act, however, is the range of factors that courts may
consider when determining the "seriousness" of the offense. The
1991 Justice Act permits the court to take more than one offense

by

the

same

offender

into

account

"seriousness" of an offense as a whole.160

when

assessing

the

For example, a court

157.
See Thomas, supra note 131, at 233-37. Thomas argues that it is
likely that seriousness will be the criterion used in the vast majority of cases to
justify the imposition of a custodial sentence. Id. at 233.
158.
1991 CJA § 1(2)(a). See also Thomas, supranote 131, at 232. Under
the Criminal Justice Act of 1991, the test for everything becomes "seriousness."
Under the 1982 Criminal Justice Act, a court could impose a custodial sentence
because of the seriousness of the offense. However, the 1991 Act declares that
the court's opinion determines seriousness, in contrast to the 1982 Act, which left
the term open to any interpretation. See Justfijing Custodial Sentences of Young
Offenders, 19 CAMBRIAN L. REV. 76, 83-84 (1988). In R. v. Bradbourne, (1985) 7
Cr. App. 180, the court defined an offense as "so serious" when its commission by
a young person "would make right thinking members of the public, knowing all

the facts, feel that justice had not been done by the passing of any sentence other
than a custodial one." Id. The "right thinking man" test was criticized because it
substituted poorly informed public notions of justice for the assessment of the
court. Id. at 84.
159.
See 1982 CJA § 1(4). Because the seriousness criterion in the 1991
Criminal Justice Act has not been applied to many cases, the first step of any
court interpreting the "seriousness" requirement will be to look at the application
of the 1982 Act in previous cases.
160. Under the 1982 Criminal Justice Act, the court was limited to
assessing offenses individually. Thomas, supra note 131, at 234. See also
Davison, [1990] 2 All E.R. at 976 (examining whether the offense for which the
defendant was convicted was so serious that a non-custodial sentence would not
be justified and deciding that each offense must be considered separately-the
total number of offenses cannot be aggregated when considering their
seriousness).
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for this purpose. 16 2

If an offender has more than two offenses that are associated, the
court may choose any of the two to determine the seriousness of
the offense. 163 The seriousness criterion of the 1991 Justice Act
differs from that of the 1982 Justice Act, which limited the court
This difference could
to assessing offenses individually. 16 4
increase the number of young offenders who are ultimately
those young
sentenced to custodial punishment, especially
16 5
offenders who commit numerous minor crimes.
Commentators expect that courts most often will use the
"seriousness" criterion as justification for imposing custodial
sentences, thereby making the definition of "seriousness"
extremely important. 166 The provisions of the 1991 Justice Act,
however, are vague, and its general terms do not give a court any
indication of the threshold for imposing a custodial sentence
under this criterion. Because the 1982 Justice Act also contained
a seriousness criterion, the courts first must analyze the previous
16 7
interpretation of the criterion under the 1982 Justice Act.
Because the 1991 Justice Act makes no attempt to explain the
meaning of seriousness, 168 it leaves a great deal of responsibility
1 69
with advocates and judges to interpret its provisions.
Courts should be wary of using their previous interpretation
of "seriousness" under the 1982 Justice Act, however, because
the context in which the seriousness criterion of the 1982 Justice
Act was considered differs from the context in which the 1991
Justice Act is to be applied. 170 Specifically, the 1982 Act only
applied to young offenders, while the 1991 Act applies to a larger

161.
1991 CJA § 1(2)(a). An offense is associated with another offense if the
offender is convicted of both in the same proceeding, sentenced for the two
offenses at the same time, or the offense is taken into consideration when the

offender is sentenced for the other offense. Thomas, supra note 131, at 234.
162.

Thomas, supra note 131, at 234.

163.
164.

Id.
Id. Commentators predict that problems with the seriousness criterion

in the 1991 Act will arise in the case of a defendant who committed what is
essentially a single, large-scale criminal enterprise with many single offenses,

each of which would be considered minor on its own. Id. In such a case, a court
may decide to impose a custodial sentence based on the number of offenses,
rather than their relative gravity. Id.
165. Id.
166. See Thomas, supra note 131, at 233.
167. Id. at 236.
168. Id. at 235.
169. The courts also will have to consider the legislative intent behind any
changes in the 1991 Criminal Justice Act. If any ambiguity remains, it should be
resolved in favor of the defendants. Editor'sRemarks, supranote 138, at 229.
170. See Thomas, supra note 131, at 236.
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171
age group, including more offenders with substantial records.
Therefore, the interpretations of provisions under the 1982
Justice Act are not necessarily applicable to the 1991 Justice Act
because the focus of the two Justice Acts is entirely different.
One case decided under the 1982 Justice Act, Bray, sets
forth an interpretation of the seriousness criterion that is
somewhat consistent with the general scheme of the 1991 Justice
Act. 17 2 In Bray, the court concluded that while the nature of an
offense may justify a custodial sentence, an offender's personal
circumstances may mitigate the seriousness of the offense, thus
173
allowing the court to decide not to impose a custodial sentence.
The holding in Bray is consistent with the overriding principle of
the 1991 Justice Act. 17 4 Although the 1991 Justice Act requires
a court to decide whether the offense meets the seriousness
criterion without reference to outside information about the
offender,1 7 5 it does indicate that the seriousness of a particular
offense must not rely on an offender's past convictions 176 and
that a court should take into account all aggravating or mitigating
circumstances of the offense. 17 7 The 1991 Justice Act also
requires the court to obtain a pre-sentence report and to consider
the information contained therein, reducing the sentence when
appropriate. 178

2. When a Custodial Sentence is Necessary for the Protection of
the Public
The second criterion justifying a custodial sentence under the
1991 Justice Act requires the crime to be of a violent or sexual
nature, and the court to determine that only a custodial sentence

171.

Id.

172.

Id. at 236-37 (discussing Bray, 1991 Crim.App. (S.) 706).

173.

Id.

174.
Id.
175.
Id. 1991 CJA§§ 1(2)(a)-(b).
"An offense shall not be regarded as more serious... by reason of any
176.
previous convictions.., or any failure of [the offender] to respond to previous
sentences." Id. § 29(1).
177.
Id. § 3(3).
178.
Id. §§ 3(1)-(4). For a general discussion of pre-sentence reporting
under the new 1991 Act, see Nigel Stone, Pre-Sentence Reports, Culpability and the
1991 Act, 1992 CRIM. L. REV. 588. Under § 3(5)(a) of the 1991 Criminal Justice
Act, a pre-sentence report is defined as a written report to assist the court in
determining the most suitable means of dealing with the offender. However, there
is a narrow exception. If one of the offenses for which the juvenile is standing
trial is triable only by indictment and the court considers a pre-sentence report
unnecessary, the court may choose not to consider the report before deciding the

sentence. 1991 CJA§ 3(2).
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is adequate to protect the public from serious harm by the
offender.1 7 9 The 1991 Justice Act permits a court to impose a
longer custodial sentence than would otherwise be permissible if
A court has complete
this second criterion is satisfied.1 8 0
discretion in applying these provisions. 1 8 ' Commentators find the
courts unfettered discretion under the 1991 Justice Act's
custodial sentencing scheme anomalous because the purpose of
the Act was to restrict the use of custodial sentences. The only
limitation on the courts discretion is the requirement that the
court consider the information in the pre-sentence report. 182
This second criterion substantially changes the past practice
of the court. Under previous Criminal Justice Acts, a court could
not impose a custodial sentence that was disproportionately long
in comparison to the seriousness of the offense solely because it
considered the defendant dangerous.18 3 Additionally, the second
criterion seems to ignore the principle of proportionality, the
purported foundation of the 1991 Justice Act. While a court
cannot impose a longer than average custodial sentence for
retributive or rehabilitative purposes, it can sentence a
"dangerous" offender to a longer than average sentence to protect
the public. By giving the court broad discretion in applying this
criterion and denying stronger safeguards for the offender, the
1991 Act allows judges to sentence offenders to longer custodial
sentences for retributive or rehabilitative purposes under the
84
guise of protecting the public.1
3. When an Offender Refuses to Serve a Non-Custodial Sentence
The third criterion under which a court may impose a
custodial sentence is when an offender refuses to serve a non-

179. 1991 CJA § 1(2)(b). See generally Thomas, supranote 131, at 238. A
violent offense is one which leads or is intended or likely to lead to a person's
death or to physical injury. A "sexual offense" is defined according to other
specific statutory provisions. 1991 CJA § 31.
180. 1991 CJA § 2(2)(b).
181. Id.
182. See Thomas, supra note 131, at 237. Thus, a court could use the
provisions of the 1991 Act first, to justify a custodial sentence for a violent or
sexual offense under the criterion that the offense was so serious that only a
custodial sentence could be justified and second, to impose a longer sentence
than would otherwise be available for the offense on the ground that such a
sentence is necessary to protect the public from harm. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 237-38.
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custodial community sentence.1 s s The 1991 Justice Act provides
that a court may impose a custodial sentence for an offender's
failure to comply with a previously ordered community sentence.
Because each criterion is independently sufficient to justify the

imposition of a custodial sentence, the 1991 Justice Act allows a
court to sentence an offender to custodial imprisonment under
this third criterion even if the nature of the offense itself is not
serious enough to warrant a custodial sentence and the offender
is not a danger to society.
Parliament designed these criteria to place important
restrictions on the imposition of both adult and juvenile custodial
sentences.1 8 6 While the criteria technically restrict the use of
custodial sentences to certain cases, the specific wording of the
statute provides individual courts with great discretion. Because
the 1991 Justice Act also governs the imposition of juvenile
custodial sentences, a judge's broad discretion under the Act may
18 7
result in even more custodial sentences for juvenile offenders.
Although the 1991 Justice Act contains provisions that require
the juvenile courts to consider the young offender's welfare when
issuing a sentence, the Act primarily emphasizes the justice
model.' 8 8 The strong influence of the justice model in the 1991
Justice Act may adversely affect the treatment of juveniles under
the Children and Young Persons Act by allowing courts to
sentence juveniles under criteria that do not consider their
welfare the highest priority. 189

185. 1991 CJA § 1(3). A community sentence consists of one or more
"community orders" such as a probation order, community service order, or
curfew order. Id. § 6(4).

186. Thomas, supranote 131, at 232-33.
187. See generally id. at 235. In addition to establishing the three criteria
under which courts may issue custodial sentences, the Criminal Justice Act of
1991 provides an additional safeguard for young offenders who are tried and
sentenced as adults under Section 53 of the Children and Young Persons Act of
1933.

The 1991 Act states that a court must thoroughly reason its decision

before imposing a custodial sentence on a young offender. 1991 CJA § 1(2). Cf.
Morris v. Crown Office, [1970] 1 Q.B. 114. However, it is thought that this
provision is only hortatory, so the court's failure to comply with it will not
invalidate the sentence. Nevertheless, Parliament designated this safeguard to

ensure that a court only imposes a custodial sentence on a juvenile as a last
resort.
188. See supratext accompanying notes 146-51.
189. Additionally, the 1991 Criminal Justice Act unites the sentencing
procedures of both juveniles and adults under the same criteria. This
organization does not separate the two systems of criminal justice, as advocated

by the Children and Young Persons Acts.
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E. The British System as Applied in the Bulger Case
The Crown Court convicted Robert Thompson and John
Venables of the abduction and murder of James Bulger under
The system
Great Britain's current juvenile justice system.

provided the boys with every benefit and safeguard under the
laws, but the court found both boys guilty of the charges.
Because both boys were ten years old at the time of the
murder, they had reached the age of criminal responsibility in
Great Britain. They were charged with murder under Section 53
of the Children and Young Persons Act of 1933. Under Section
53(2), children aged ten and older may be tried as adults for the
crimes of murder and manslaughter. 1 90 However, because both
boys were under age fourteen, 1 9 1 the 1933 Act required the
prosecution to satisfy the heightened burden of proof before the
court could find either Venables or Thompson guilty of murder.
The prosecution bore the onus of proving to the court that the
boys murdered James Bulger with the requisite mischievous
discretion. 19
The prosecution had no difficulty proving mischievous
To prove that the boys knew the
discretion in this case.
difference between right and wrong, the prosecution introduced a
wide variety of evidence about their families and educational
backgrounds, as.well as the details of the murder. 19 3 The
physical evidence demonstrated the extreme brutality of the
murder, and the testimony of the witnesses tracked the two
young defendants for two and one-half miles to the scene of the
murder. Further evidence showed that both boys possessed
normal intelligence and had attended a Church of England
primary school, where they were taught the difference between
194
right and wrong.
Under the facts of this case, the jury could convict the boys of
murder or manslaughter. 195 The judge instructed the jury that
they should convict both boys of murder if the jury found that the

190.
191.

1933 CYPA § 53(2). See discussion supranote 98.
See supratext accompanying notes 69-72.

192.

See i.

193.

Edward Pilldngton, Liverpool Boys Jailed for 'Cunning" Murder of
Toddler, GAZETIE (MONTREAL), November 25, 1993, at Al. The prosecution called

more than thirty witnesses and handed more than a hundred exhibits to the jury.
Id.
194. Eugene Robinson, 2 British Boys Guilty in Toddler's Murder, WASH.
POST, November 25, 1993, at A47. Both boys pled not guilty, blaming each other

for the actual murder. Id.
195.

The Meaning ofMurder,DAILY MAIL (London), November 25, 1993, at 7.
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boys decided to kill or inflict serious harm on Bulger. 196 The
judge also instructed the jury that the actual infliction of the fatal
97
injury was

immaterial to the jury's determination

of guilt.'

decisive
Instead, the presence of mischievous discretion was the
198

factor in the choice between murder and manslaughter.
In determining whether the boys were guilty of murder or

manslaughter, the court instructed the jury to consider several
factors. The brutality of the murder, including the number of
blows to Bulger and the weapons the boys used, was to weigh
heavily in the jury's reasoning. 19 9 The judge also reminded the
jury that both boys had kicked Bulger before they killed him, that
neither boy had a mental defect, and that both were of average
The jury also considered possible mitigating
intelligence. 2 ° °
factors such as the boys' troubled home lives, their economic
deprivation, and disciplinary problems in school. After taking
into account these mitigating factors, the jury found that the boys
possessed the requisite mischievous discretion when killing
James Bulger and held Venables and Thompson criminally
responsible as adults for the murder.
Because Thompson and Venables were convicted and
sentenced under Section 53 of the Children and Young Persons
Act of 1933, both boys were automatically sentenced to detention
at Her Majesty's Pleasure. 2 0 While this penalty can mean a life
sentence, the Home Secretary periodically reviews the progress of
all young offenders and their recent conduct to decide if they are
2 °2
fit to return to society.

Id. "Either of the 11-year-old defendants can be found guilty if it was
196.
clear they meant [Bulger] serious injury." Id.
Id.
197.
198. Id. By not offering any defense witnesses, the defense hoped that the
jury would opt for the lesser charge of manslaughter. Robinson, supra note 194,
atA7.
The Meaning of Murder, supra note 195, at 7. "You will take into
199.
account the age of the victim .... and that the murder... involved a number of

blows to the skull of a... nearly three-year-old little boy." Id.
200. Id. Judge Morland also instructed the jury not to let emotions play a
part in the final decision. Id.
201. Pilldngton, supra note 193, at Al. A defense source said that the
Crown Prosecution Service had refused to negotiate anything less than a murder
charge. Id. Judge Morland did state that the boys will be detained for "many,
many years." Id. Typically, even adults found guilty of murder in Great Britain
serve approximately ten years. The last time an eleven-year-old was convicted of
murder was in 1968, when Mary Bell was imprisoned for the murder of two
toddlers. Bell was released after serving a twelve-year custodial sentence. Id.
202. Thompson and Venables will be remanded to one of Great Britain's
secure lock-up facilities. When the boys reach the age of fifteen, they could be

transferred to an institution for young offenders. If they are still in custody at the
age of twenty-one, they could then be sent to an adult prison.
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F. Criticism of the BritishJuvenile System
Although Venables and Thompson had the benefit of every
safeguard available under Great Britain's current juvenile system,
203
some commentators contend that the current juvenile system
2 °4
is not sufficient to protect the welfare of young offenders.
Specifically, commentators view Section 53 of the Children and
Young Persons Act of 1933 as a serious threat to the liberty of
many young offenders, and speculate that the juvenile courts are
using Section 53 to circumvent the restrictions placed on their
Courts
sentencing powers by the Criminal Justice Acts.2 0 5
allegedly use their wide discretion under Section 53 to incarcerate
20 6
a wide variety of juvenile offenders for long periods of time.
Because Parliament enacted Section 53 of the Children and
Young Persons Act to apply only to juvenile offenders who
committed grave crimes, the courts' recent use of this section to
impose custodial sentences on a wide array of offenders has
attracted criticism. Juveniles tried and convicted for grave crimes
under Section 53 represent a minority of the young offenders
punished under that provision of the law. 2 ° 7 Moreover, only
those juveniles convicted of murder must automatically be tried
outside the juvenile justice system and sentenced under Section
Juveniles who
53 to detention at Her Majesty's Pleasure. 20 8
commit other violent offenses are not necessarily tried or
sentenced under Section 53.2 09 The juvenile courts have the
discretion to sentence juveniles who commit all other violent
crimes, except murder, to a multitude of both custodial and non2 10
custodial sentences.
Section 53 has been criticized on several additional grounds.
First, the sentencing scheme under Section 53 dictates that the
crime of murder must be handled outside the juvenile system,
thus ensuring that at least one part of the juvenile system is
connected to the adult criminal system.2 1 1 While the young

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

See generallyTurner, supranote 5.
See generally Godsland & Fielding, supra note 32.
Id-at 283.
1933 CYPA § 53; Magistrates' Courts Act § 24(1).
Godsland & Fielding, supra note 32, at 289.
Id.
I& See suprapart ll.C.3.
Id. Magistrates' Courts Act § 24(1).

211.

Id. One commentator believes that the exception for murder is an

unnecessary concession by those favoring the welfare model to proponents of the

justice model, and is an overreaction to some juvenile crimes. The commentator
argues that there are no juvenile crimes which are so heinous that the offenders
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offender is assured legal representation, a jury, and other aspects
of a "public display of justice," the question remains whether most
juveniles, especially those of a young age, sufficiently understand
the laws and procedures of the normative justice system to be
2 12
tried there.
Second, the courts' broad discretion under Section 53(a) to
213
determine the sentence for violent crimes other than murder
has resulted in a wide range of sentences for. the same crime.
Some courts avoid Section 53 and use alternative means to
sentence juveniles who commit crimes that clearly fall within that
provision's criteria, 2 14 while other courts use Section 53 to
2 15
sentence such juveniles to detention for long periods of time.
Sentences for violent offenses, such as manslaughter and
robbery, range from non-custodial sentences such as fines and
community orders to long periods of detention under Section
53.216 Consequently, the courts' virtually unfettered discretion
over sentencing adds an element of chance to the nature and
217
duration of the sentence.

The application of Section 53 to juveniles has also been
criticized on procedural grounds. Juveniles charged with more
serious crimes against the person spend at least two or three
months in detention before trial.2 1 8 This time is usually spent in
a Prison Department Remand Center where juveniles are not
separated from other offenders who are up to twenty-one years
old.2 1 9 In these centers, juveniles encounter many aspects of
adult prison life.

should not be subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, whose first concern
is their welfare. See Turner, supranote 5, at 736.
212.
Id.
213.
The same criticism applies to sentencing under the Criminal Justice
Act of 1991. See TERRILL, supra note 2, at 27-30. See also infra Appendix I.
214.
Godsland & Fielding, supranote 32, at 289. Only eighty-seven percent
of manslaughter and attempted murder cases heard by the Crown Court were
sentenced under Section 53(2) of the Children and Young Persons Act of 1933;
thus, alternate means of sentencing were used in thirteen percent of these cases.

Id.
215.
Id.
216.
Id. Life sentences are often imposed for manslaughter, rape, and
wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm. Id.
217.
Id. at 289-90.
218.
See Godsland & Fielding, supra note 32, at 291. In one study, the
authors discovered that bail and remand to the care of a local authority were

rarely granted for such juveniles. Instead, juvenile offenders experienced an
average delay of four and one-half months between arrest and sentence. The

longest delay experienced was eight and one-half months, with some young
offenders experiencing six months or more. Id.
219. Id.
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Juveniles also report that the judicial process induces a great
deal of stress. 2 20 The long period between arrest and trial, as well
as the trial itself, are frightening to young offenders. 22 1 Although
juveniles sentenced in the adult courts have access to the normal
court procedures, the young offender and his family rarely
understand the process, forcing them to rely entirely on legal
2 23
advisors. 2 2 2 Publicity of the trial can also cause anxiety.
22 4
When
Under juvenile court practices, publicity is not allowed.
the
details
a young offender is tried in the adult courts, however,
of the trial often reach the national and international press, as in
the Bulger case, inflaming local feelings against the juveniles and
22 5
their families.
Finally, juvenile offenders experience uncertainty and stress
once sent to the detention center to serve their sentence.
Because detention at Her Majesty's Pleasure under Section 53 is
an indeterminate sentence, neither the offender nor the staff at
the detention center knows the offender's eventual release
date.2 2 6 The Home Secretary periodically reviews each case to
determine the extent to which the offender has been rehabilitated,
but the young offender is not informed of his status and cannot
2 27
plan for the future.
The treatment of Thompson and Venables in the Bulger case
Their trial received
illustrates some of these criticisms.
substantial national and international press coverage. The boys

220.
Id.
Id. Both Thompson and Venables remained motionless during most of
221.
their trial, although it seemed that each understood what was happening and the
consequences they faced. Venables wept when the verdict of guilty was returned,
and Thompson continued to show no emotion. See generally Robinson, supra
note 194.
222.
See Godsland & Fielding, supranote 32, at 291.
223.
Id.
224.
Id. The courts cannot release the name and address of the young
offender or his family. After sentencing Thompson and Venables, Judge Moreland
permitted the boys to be identified but prohibited from being published the

photographs of either the boys or the detention centers in which they would
reside. Turner, supra note 5, at 736.
225. See Godsland & Fielding, supra note 32, at 292. Many commentators
claim that the anxiety resulting from such publicity could prevent or impede
rehabilitation. See Turner, supra note 5, at 736. Although the boys' names were
not released to the press until after their conviction, the trial had to be moved
from Liverpool, the location of the murder, to Preston because of repeated mob
violence directed at the boys. See Meares, supra note 39. At least one
commentator suggested that moving the trial only thirty miles away from the
scene of the murder did not allow Thompson and Venables a fair trial with an
unbiased jury. See Turner, supranote 5, at 735.

226.

Godsland & Fielding, supranote 32, at 294-95.

227.

Id.
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became the subject of mob violence, experienced an adult trial at
the age of eleven, and are now incarcerated indefinitely with the
possibility of being detained for life.
G. Recent Legislationin GreatBritain
The latest battle between the justice and welfare schools of

thought was won by the justice model with the recent passage of
Great Britain's Criminal Justice and Public Order Bill (Bill) in
November 1994.228 The Bill was one of the most controversial
measures considered by Parliament in recent years.2 29 The Bill
represents the British government's increasingly tough stance on

"law and0 order" issues and favors the innocent and the victims of
crime.

23

The Criminal Justice and Public Order Bill is the product of
British Home Secretary Michael Howard's twenty-seven point plan
for tackling crime. 23 1 Howard presented this plan at the 1994
Tory Conference and intended it to result in the jailing of the
more persistent offenders, removing such offenders from the
community so they cannot commit more crimes. 2 32 The2Bill itself
restricts bail and abolishes an offender's right to silence. 33
The Bill introduces several changes in the laws dealing with
young offenders. 23" First, the Bill provides for the development of

228. See Terrence Shaw, Howard's Core Law Reforms Survive Intact
Criminal Justice Bill, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), October 29, 1994, at 11
[hereinafter Howard's CoreLaw Reforms]. The Criminal Justice and Public Order
Bill received the Royal Assent on November 3, 1994. See Terrence Shaw, Act
Makes Ravers Face the Music, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), November 4, 1994, at
12.
229. Shaw, Howard's Core Law Reforms, supra. While both the justice
model supporters-the Tory Party-and the welfare model supporters-the
Labour Party-agree that something has to be done to combat crime, their
approaches are completely different. The Labour Party believes the roots of crime
are in deprivation and unemployment and, thus, wish to address the problem at
that level. The Tory Party believes that crime is actually a part of human nature
and, therefore, needs to be combated with deterrence and harsh punishments.
230. See Alex D. Smith, Conservations: Cracking Down on Crime, GUARDIAN
(London), October 11, 1994, at Ell.
231. Id. Crime figures have doubled in the last fifteen years and some
Home Office estimates suggest that three times as many crimes are committed as
are reported. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Shaw, Howard's Core Law Reforms, supra note 228. The Bill also
changes other aspects of the criminal law, such as limiting bail for many
offenders and denying it completely for murder, manslaughter, and rape when the
offender has been previously convicted of one of those crimes. The Bill further
allows a court to draw inferences of guilt from a defendant's choice to remain
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five new secure training units to house persistent young
offenders.2 3 5 These units will have room for 300 offenders, and
space for another 170 offenders is already planned.2 3 6 Second,
the Bill enables a court to impose a longer sentence on persistent
offenders aged twelve to fourteen. This sentence would last from
six months to two years and would be served in one of the five
new secure training facilities. 23 7 The Bill also empowers the
courts to order juveniles aged twelve to fourteen to be kept in
secure accommodations while awaiting trial or sentencing. 23 8
Third, the Bill enlarges the category of serious offenses for which
children may receive extended periods of detention and doubles
the maximum period of detention for young offenders, aged fifteen
to seventeen, from twelve months to twenty-four months.2 3 9
These changes in the laws applicable to young offenders have
already received much criticism. First, commentators criticize the
plan to build more secure training units. Under the old laws,
juveniles aged twelve to fourteen were sent to local council units
where they were kept near their families. 2 4° The new secure
training units could hold youths hundreds of miles from their
homes.2 4 ' Second, the new secure training units seek not only to
contain the overflow of dangerous young offenders, but also to
imprison less serious offenders. 2 42 For example, under the old
laws a twelve-year-old who has shoplifted three times and has
disobeyed the terms of a community service order would usually
be sentenced to a harsher community sentence. 2 4 3 Instead, the
Bill encourages the courts to imprison such an offender. 24 4 This

silent when questioned by the police. Id. However, given the focus of this Note,
only the aspects of the Bill that affect young offenders are discussed.
235.
Young Offenders, supranote 31, at 65.
236.
Shaw, Howard'sCore Law Reforms, supranote 228. Private companies
will run these new secure training units. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.

239. Id. Mr. Howard also has announced that community sentences
against young offenders will be more stringent, including the removal of graffiti
and the collection of litter. See Darbyshire, supra note 51.

This announcement

followed a storm of protests that erupted over some young offenders who were
sent on expensive foreign holidays aimed at rehabilitating them through

"character-building experiences." Because the public felt that such trips simply
rewarded the offender, Mr. Howard banned the trips. Smith, supranote 230.
240.
241.

See Young Offenders, supranote 31.
Id. Most studies show that family contact helps to reduce recidivism

rates. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
Such a sentence could include working for the victims of his
crimes or undergoing intensive counseling. Id.
244. Id.
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practice contradicts the previously stated goal of the juvenile
justice system to impose custodial sentences only as a last resort.
However, these new measures to deal with persistent young
offenders will take a while to implement, and their future effect on

juvenile crime and rates of juvenile recidivism is yet unknown.
III.

EUROPEAN LAWS AND INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS

The debate in Great Britain that accompanied the murder of
James Bulger and the subsequent trial and convictions of two
ten-year-old boys revolved around different paradigms of juvenile
justice and ideas of "individual responsibility," "economic
deprivation," and "cracldng down on juvenile offenders."2 45 The
murder of the toddler also stirred similar debates across Europe
and throughout the world. While the laws of Great Britain and
those of many other states reflect the long-standing debate over
the goals of juvenile justice, the United Nations has suggested an
international solution to the rising rates of juvenile crime.
Specifically, the United Nations has recommended minimum
In
standards for the administration of juvenile justice. 2 "'
juvenile
Britain's
of
Great
development
future
the
addition,
offender laws may be influenced by its membership in the
European Union, which has entertained the idea of legislating in
the field of juvenile justice.2 4 7 In particular, as the organs of the
European Union mature, they may make setting minimum
standards for juvenile justice a priority. 2 48 Generally, the rise in
the juvenile crime rate has individual states questioning whether
their methods of dealing with juvenile crime are the most
effective.
In re-evaluating their juvenile justice systems, most states
face the issue of how to treat the very young offender. Every
nation has a different idea about the proper age of criminal responsibility and whether the very young should be punished

Id. David Selbourne, Civic Duty .'rst or We Drown, INDEPENDENT
245.
(London), November 25, 1993, at 21.
246.

See generallyMARGERY FRY Er AL., LAWLESS YOUIII: A CHALLENGE TO THE

NEW EUROPE (1947); LOPEZ-REY, supra note 3. See generally SEVENTH CONGRESS,
supra note 6; Report of the Secretary General, Eighth United Nations Congress on

the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Juvenile Justice and the
Protection of the Young, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.144/4 (1990) (implementation of the
Beijing Rules and adoption of the Riyadh Rules) [hereinafter Report from Eighth

Congress].
247. See generally Recommendation on Consistency in Sentencing, EUR. PARL.
ASS. DEB., 1992-93 Sess., Doc. No. 4(92) 17.
248. Id.
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within the juvenile court system or rehabilitated in the community.
Thus, the development of international standards for
juvenile justice systems is hampered by the inability of individual
states to agree on whether a justice or welfare model should
dominate. If juvenile crime among the very young does not decline, perhaps individual states, if not the international community as a whole, will adopt Great Britain's current juvenile justice system-including its low age of criminal responsibility-as a
workable model of juvenile justice.
A. The United Nations and Juvenile Justice

1. The United Nations Minimum Standards
Although the United Nations cannot require individual states
to implement its policies, UN policies serve as important
guidelines.2 4 9 While the United Nations has developed criminal
policies over the years, it traditionally has not been successful in
encouraging individual states to implement such policies. The
area of criminal law seemed firmly embedded within the scope of

national jurisdiction, and most states refused to give up national
autonomy in this policy area.
Beginning in 1946, however, the United Nations began to
develop an international criminal policy that had some slight

impact on the criminal policies of certain states. 25 0 The current

United Nations policy on criminal justice evolved against the
backdrop of three main principles: (1) violent crime constitutes
one of the most severe problems of the late twentieth century; (2)
the penal systems in many states are frequently unable to deal
with such crime; and (3) criminal justice is not equated with
social justice in many countries. 2 5 ' Nevertheless, the United
Nations policy on criminal justice has been implemented by
2s 2
individual states only to a limited extent.
Although the United Nations commenced studies on juvenile
2 53
delinquency in 1940, these first studies had limited value.
Records of the first meetings of the United Nations reveal the
same debate over the justice and welfare models that occurs in
individual states today. The supporters of the welfare model

249.

See generallyLOPEZ-REY, supranote 3.

250.
251.
252.
253.

Id. at ix.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 101. The studies only analyzed the legislation pending in a few

countries. See id.
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proposed that the United Nations adopt a broad view of juvenile
delinquency, which would encompass the social and economic
problems of children. 2 M In contrast, advocates of the justice
model proposed that the United Nations adopt a narrower and
more practical solution to juvenile crime aimed solely at
2 55
prevention.
The Second Congress of the United Nations actually made the
first step, albeit minimal, toward the development of an
international juvenile justice policy by providing insight into the
meaning of the term "juvenile delinquency."23 6 The debate over
the meaning of juvenile delinquency hinged on its international
"characterization." The justice model supporters advocated a
narrow definition of juvenile delinquency, encompassing only
criminal violations by juveniles. 25 7 The welfare model supporters,
however, advanced the idea that the term should include a broad
range of juvenile problems, such as troubled and homeless
youth. 2 5s The justice model supporters won this first battle when
the Second Congress decided that the term "juvenile delinquency"
should not include social welfare measures.2 5 9 Although the
United Nations did not formally adopt a definition of juvenile
delinquency, it restricted the meaning of the term to juvenile
2 60
violations of criminal law.
The United Nations did not address the issues of juvenile
delinquency and juvenile justice systems again until the Sixth
United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and
Treatment of Offenders in 1980 (Sixth Congress). 2 61
The
discussions at the Sixth Congress focused on the welfare model
and called for minimum standards to implement such a model of
juvenile justice internationally.2 6 2 The deliberations over juvenile
justice revolved around the need for greater family and
community control of juveniles and the avoidance of judicial
intervention. 2 63 While the Sixth Congress did not invalidate the
characterization of the term "juvenile delinquency" adopted at the
Second Congress, which was based on the justice model, the

254.

LOPEZ-REY, supranote 3, at 102-04.

255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 103.
Id.
Id. at 104-05.
Id.
Id.
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focus of the Sixth Congress definitely shifted toward the welfare
2
model1. 64
The Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of
Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (Seventh Congress)
resulted in the most important development in the United Nations
juvenile justice policy. At the Seventh Congress, the United
Nations recommended the adoption of the United Nations
Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile
Justice (Beijing Rules or Rules).26 5 The Beijing Rules set forth
minimum standards for the administration of a juvenile justice
system and the care of juveniles within that system.2 6 6 The
United Nations designed the Beijing Rules to serve as a model for
its member states in their development of a comprehensive
framework of social justice for all juveniles. 2 6 7 The General
Assembly adopted the Beijing Rules and called for its member
states to enact any appropriate legislation to reflect the minimum
26 8
standards within their individual juvenile justice systems.
The Beijing Rules adhere to the welfare model of juvenile
justice. The commentary to the Rules states that they were
designed to promote juvenile welfare to the greatest possible
extent and to minimize the need for intervention by the juvenile
justice system.26 9 The General Assembly adopted the Beijing
Rules with the aim of having established criminal systems
throughout the world apply the minimum standards. 2 70
In
particular, the Rules broadened the range of ages covered by the
definitions of "juvenile" and the "age of criminal responsibility"

because existing legal systems already contained widely varied
age limits in those areas.2 7 1 The Rules stated that variations in
their application were inevitable because any juvenile justice
system necessarily depended on the economic, social, political,
272
cultural, and legal systems currently in place in each state.

264.

Id.

265. IL See also SEVENTH CONGRESS, supra note 6, at 18-19.
266.
LOPEZ-REY, supranote 3, at 104-05.
267.
Id.
268.
Id.
269. Id. at 21 (Beijing Rules, Commentary to Rule 1).
270.
Id. In fact, the United Nations deliberately formulated the Rules to
apply within many different legal systems. Id. at 22 (Beijing Rule 2.3 and
Commentary).
271. Id.
272.
Id. States define the maximum age of a juvenile anywhere between
seven and eighteen years of age. However, the Beijing Rules state that such
variety should not diminish their impact in any way. SEVENTH CONGRESS, supra
note 6, at 22.
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Consistent with the welfare model, the Beijing Rules set forth
a model system of juvenile justice designed to meet the special
needs of young offenders and to protect their rights while meeting
the needs of society.2 73 Specifically, the Beijing Rules provide
27 4
guidelines for determining the age of criminal responsibility.
Rule 4 of the Beijing Rules states: "[i]n those legal systems
recognizing the concept of the age of criminal responsibility for
juveniles, the beginning of that age shall not be fixed at too low an
age level, bearing in mind the facts of emotional, mental and
intellectual maturity." 275 The comments to this Rule encourage
all states to agree on the lowest age limit that could apply
internationally,7 6taking into account each state's own cultural and
2
legal systems.
While the Beijing Rules dictate that the welfare of the juvenile
should be the most important concern of a juvenile justice
system, the sentencing guidelines of the Beijing Rules emphasize
the justice model. Rule 5 proposes that a juvenile justice system
ensure that any criminal sanctions imposed on the young
offender be proportional to the particular circumstances of the
crime and the offender.2 7 7 The comments to Rule 5 specifically
state that any sentencing scheme for juveniles should follow the
principle of proportionality. 2 78 This principle is based on the

justice model's idea of "just deserts."

While a court may not

sanction an offender for purely punitive purposes, the gravity of
27 9
the offense is still a factor in determining proper punishment.
Therefore, the Beijing Rules dictate that a court must base
offense as well as the
juvenile sentences on the gravity of the
280
offender.
the
of
personal circumstances

Id. at 19. The Beijing Rules were developed with an awareness of the
273.
young offender's special needs "owing to their early stage of human development."

Id. pmbl.
. 274.

275.

Id. at 23.

Id.

276. Id. "The minimum age of criminal responsibility differs widely owing to
history and culture. The modem approach would be to consider whether a child
can live up to the moral and psychological components of criminal responsibility;
that is whether a child, by virtue of her or his individual discernment and
understanding, can be held responsible for essentially anti-social behavior." Id.
at 23 (Commentary to Beijing Rule 4.1).
277. Id. at 24 (Beijing Rule 5.1).
Id. (Commentary to Beijing Rule 5.1).
278.
See Thomas, supra note 131, at 232.
279.
280. The Commentary to Rule 5 lists factors to be considered in juvenile
sentencing such as social status, family situation, the harm caused by the
LOPEZ-REY,
offense, and any other factors affecting personal circumstances.
supra note 3, at 24.
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Finally, the Beijing Rules call for broad discretion within an
individual state's juvenile justice system. Rule 6.1 states that a
nation should establish a system of juvenile justice
administration that allows for the exercise of discretion at all
significant levels of proceedings. 28 1 However, Rule 6.2 also states
that the juvenile justice system should make those persons with
28 2
discretion accountable for their decisions in particular cases.
The Rules establish the principle that broad discretion must
always be accompanied by checks and balances to safeguard the
juvenile's welfare.
In 1990, the Eighth United Nations Congress on the
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders made two
additions to the development of an international juvenile policy.
First, the General Assembly recommended and adopted the
United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile
Delinquency (Riyadh Guidelines). 28 3
Second, the Congress
studied the implementation of the Beijing Rules by individual
states.28 4 Most of the European states, including Great Britain,
France, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, and Russia, reported
that their national systems already reflected some or all of the
Beijing Rules.2 8 5 While such participation illustrates that many
states are interested in developing an international juvenile
justice system, the fact that most nations reported that their
current systems reflected the goals of the Beijing system
demonstrates that national policy concerns are still their first
priority.
2. Great Britain's Compliance with the United Nations Standards
Great Britain's current juvenile justice system, as expressed
in the various provisions of the Children and Young Persons Acts
and the Criminal Justice Acts, reflects the minimum standards of
the Beijing Rules. The recent enactment of the Criminal Justice
Act of 1991 exemplifies Great Britain's compliance with the
Beijing Rules. First, Great Britain's juvenile justice system is
separate from the adult criminal system, with the exception of
sentencing under Section 53 of the Children and Young Persons
Act of 1933.286 Second, the British system employs the principle

281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.

Id. at 24-25 (Beijing Rule 6.1).
Id. at 25 (Beijing Rule 6.2).
Reportfrom Eighth Congress, supranote 246, at 37-41.
Id. at 5.
Id.
See discussion suprapart 1.C.3.
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of proportionality in its sentencing scheme. 28 7 Finally, the British
system allows courts to exercise broad discretion, yet provides

safeguards to limit that power. 28 8 The fact that the Beijing Rules
and the British system draw specific provisions from both the
welfare and justice models perhaps illustrates that no system
could be based exclusively on either the welfare model or the
justice model.
B. The EuropeanCommunity and Juvenile Justice
Great Britain's membership in the European Community may
affect the British juvenile criminal justice system. The ultimate
goal of the European Community is to move toward an "ever
closer union" consisting of independently functioning member
states. 28 9 The power to adopt legislation remains largely with the
member states, although the European Parliament may share this
Community law
Eventually, European
power concurrently. 2 90
291
could strongly influence areas of national law.
European Community law presently affects the national law
of its member states in one of two ways. In certain areas of
policy, the member states relinquished power to the Community
and, therefore, those matters are no longer managed at the
national level. 29 In other areas of policy, the Community and the
individual member states share legislative powers. 2 93 Presently,

individual states retain jurisdiction over criminal law and criminal
could decide to influence
procedure. The Community, however,
29 4
future.
the
in
law
criminal
of
the area

287. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 135-36.
288. See supratext accompanying notes 150-54.
289. See generally JOSEPHINE STEINE, TEXTBOOK ON EEC LAW 4, 5 (3d ed.
1988). An express "federal" goal was dropped from the final draft of the Treaty of
European Union in favor of a pledge to an "ever closer union." Id. at 5.
290. Id.
See T.C. Hartley, The Impact of European Community Law in the
291.
CriminalProcess, 1981 CRIM. L. REV. 75.
292. Id.
Id.
293.
Id. at 76. The Community law is most influential on national law when
294.
it has a "direct effect." In order to be directly effective, a Community law must be
clear and unambiguous, unconditional, and must not envisage further action on
the part of any authority before it comes into operation. If a provision of
Community law is directly effective, it applies in each member state as part of the
law of the land "without any action on the part of the national legislature."
(emphasis in original). Id. The European Communities Act of 1972 provides "for
the operation of direct effect and [recognizes] the supremacy of Community law."
Id. at 76 n.2. For a general discussion regarding the application of the criteria for
"direct effects" in the case law of the European Court of Justice, see id.
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The European Community has not passed any legislation
affecting juvenile criminal justice systems. Moreover, there is no

indication that the Community plans to enact any such legislation
in the near future.2 95 In light of the European Community's goal
of substantial unification, however, the Community may try to
develop a unified criminal justice policy.
Currently, several obstacles stand in the way of a unified
criminal policy within the European Community.
Most
significantly, European states do not agree on whether the welfare
model or the justice model should prevail in a juvenile justice
system. Furthermore, each state differs in its determination of
the age of criminal responsibility. In general, Great Britain has
the lowest age of criminal responsibility within the European
Community and among industrialized nations in general.2 9 6 With
most states experiencing rising crime rates, especially among the
very young, perhaps it is time for other states to follow Great
Britain's example and lower their age of criminal responsibility, at
least for the most violent of crimes. A brief comparison of Great
Britain's juvenile system with that of France, however,
demonstrates that a lower, unified age of criminal responsibility is
not likely in the near future.
C. The Juvenile Justice System in France: The Welfare Model
A recent event in France, unfortunately reminiscent of the
Bulger incident, thrust that nation into the debate over the
treatment of juvenile offenders. Specifically, many commentators
and policymakers in France are questioning the proper age of
criminal
responsibility,
especially
for
violent
crimes.
Unsurprisingly, the opinions in France are as divided as the
297
opinions in Great Britain.
The event that precipitated the debate over juvenile justice in
France involved facts as shocking as those of the Bulger incident.

295.
The Council of Europe, however, has made recommendations
regarding sentencing, particularly with regard to the use of previous convictions
and aggravating and mitigating factors in the determination of sentences. See
Council of Europe Recommendation on Consistency in Sentencing, EUR. PARL. ASS.
DEB., 1992-93 Sess., Doc. No. R.(92)17.
296.
See TERRILL, supra note 2, at 148-357. In France, the age of criminal
responsibility is 13; in Sweden, it is 15; in Japan, it is 14; in the Soviet Union, it
is 16 for most offenses. Id. However, Scotland's age of criminal responsibility is
only 8. Horri/ing Precedents,supranote 33, at 9.
297.
See Charles Bremner, Evil Children Chill French With Echo of Bulger
Case, TIOES (London), November 29, 1993 (Overseas News).
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On November 28, 1993, Boy T, 2 98 a ten-year-old, confessed to the
beating and murder of Pierre Boura, a thirty-seven-year-old
vagrant from Vitry-sur-Seine. 2 9 9 Another vagrant, Jean-Marc,
was charged with inciting Boy T and two other boys, who were

between the ages of eight and ten, to murder. 3°° According to
different accounts, the boys punched, kicked, and hit Boura with

wooden sticks. The boys then attempted to hide Boura's body in
a shallow well. 3 0 '
The examining judge decided not to bring murder charges
against the boys and instead prosecuted them for a lesser offense.
The children were charged with the offense of "deliberate
wounding leading to unintended death," a charge equivalent to
manslaughter. 3 °2 The judge prosecuted the children on a lesser
offense because he believed that the children were too young to
understand the consequences of their actions.3 0 3 The event
sparked- debate in France over a child's culpability for his or her
3 o4
actions.
The juvenile justice systems developed by Great Britain and
France are on opposite ends of the spectrum. Great Britain leans
more toward the justice model, although the welfare model
dominates some aspects of its system. In contrast, France's
system embraces the principles of the welfare model more fully.
An analysis of the two systems provides a study of one possible
outcome of the debate between the welfare and justice models in
the European Community and the international community as a
whole.
The French juvenile justice system developed from the
welfare model. From the end of World War II through 1982,
France's criminal justice system, including the juvenile system,
favored a high degree of freedom and individualization on the part
of judges in sentencing.3 0 5 French courts had the discretion to
impose whatever correctional measures they deemed appropriate
in relation to the crime committed, up to a stipulated
maximum. 3 w This individualization of penalties supported the

298.

Id. Boy T was interviewed by Le JournalDu Dimanche. He confessed

to beating the vagrant to death. Id.
299.

Id.

300.

Id.

According to media accounts, the boys had befriended these

vagrants weeks before the incident and visited them often. Id.

301.

Id.

302.

Id.

303.
304.

Id.
Id.

305. See George W. Pugh & Jean H. Pugh, Measures for Malaise, Recent
French 'Law and Order"Legislation,42 LA. L. REV. 1301, 1315 (1982).

306.

Id.
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notion that the purpose of imprisonment was to rehabilitate the
offender for future reintegration into society, instead of
3 °7
retribution.
However, rising violent crime rates forced French
policymakers to develop a new criminal justice system with a
greater emphasis on the justice model than its previous system.
Because French policymakers viewed the original criminal system

as ineffective with regard to violent adult criminals, the
policymakers3 0 8 enacted the Law of Security and Liberty in
1981. 3 09 The new law sought "to restore to the criminal law its
credibility by assuring certainty of punishment of the perpetrators
of violent crimes."3 10 Thus, the new French system incorporated
the theme of the justice model in the enactment of the Law of
Security and Liberty.
Although the Law of Security and Liberty incorporated the
justice model, its application was limited to adult offenders. The
juvenile offenders were still prosecuted under a system based on
the welfare model.3 1 ' The French juvenile system, like the British
system, establishes a hierarchy of criminal responsibility for
juveniles based on their age and the offense committed. Even
with rising crime rates among juveniles in France, the state has
not changed its age of criminal responsibility since Article 67 of
the French Penal Code was adopted in 1955.312 In France, the
age of criminal responsibility is thirteen. Therefore, children
under thirteen do not participate in any type of criminal
proceeding. They are handled separately and informally within
3 13
the social welfare system.
The first category of criminally responsible juveniles includes
those offenders aged thirteen to fifteen. 3 14 Juveniles between the
ages of thirteen and fifteen can receive penal sanctions. In order

307. Id.
308. Id. at 1302. From 1972 to 1979, France had an eighty-five percent
increase in violent crime. Id. at 1303 n.13.
309. Id. (citing Law of February 2, 1981, publishedin [1981] D.S.L. 37).
310. Id. at 1315. Under previous laws, "sentencing judges" had the
authority to reduce sentences and to grant leaves and pardons. Some offenders
were released under this power even though they had committed brutal crimes.
This abuse led to great public mistrust of the practice and a call for a decrease in
the judges' power to grant such releases. The 1981 Law of Security and Liberty
granted that request. Id. at 1316-17.
311. Id.
312. Code p~nal [C. P91.] art. 69 (Fr.). According to Article 67, the age of

criminal responsibility is determined by taking into consideration the age of the
offender and the type of offense committed. The legislature also considers the

circumstances of the offense important. Id.
313.
314.

Pugh & Pugh, supra note 305, at 1316-17.
See generallyTERPRLL, supranote 2, at 148-52.
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to prosecute these offenders, a court must first determine that the
offense was serious. 3 15 Additionally, Article 67 of the Penal Code
requires a juvenile aged thirteen to fifteen to receive a shorter
sentence than an adult would receive for the same crime. Article
67 generally requires that the duration of the juvenile's
3 16
incarceration equal one-half of the typical adult sentence.
However, given the emphasis on the welfare model in the French
system, the judge will try to impose a short, non-institutional
sentence if the circumstances of the case support such a
3 17
sentence.
The last category of criminally responsible juveniles includes
young offenders aged sixteen to eighteen.3 1 8 If an offender is
included in this category, the court may impose penal sanctions if
the judge deems it appropriate. The judge has great discretion in
this area and makes the determination of whether to award a
penal sanction according to the circumstances of the case.
However, the type of offense committed is usually the determining
factor, and a court likely
will impose penal sanctions only for the
3 19
most serious offenses.
The French judicial system refused to hold Boy T and his
cohorts criminally responsible for their brutal murder of Boura.

The children were not held criminally responsible because they
had not reached the age of thirteen at the time of the murder. A
juvenile court will send the boys to a state institution for
"therapeutic education."3 2 0 Such institutions provide both longterm and short-term care and, depending on the individual
institution, the regimen may be either strict or more
permissive.3 2 1 However, Boy T will not be "locked up" in this
institution because, with the exception of the adult prisons that
have a juvenile wing, there are no closed facilities for the juvenile
delinquent in France.3 22 The emphasis is placed on keeping the

315. Id- at 148. The French Penal Code does not define what constitutes a
serious crime. However, Article 67 of the French Penal Code, which provides for a
reduction in penal sanctions when assessed against juvenile offenders, lists
various types of sanctions that must be reduced in the case of a young offender.
Such sanctions include death, imprisonment, hard labor for time, loss of civil
rights, and banishment. Code penal [C. P N.] art. 67 (Fr.). Presumably, crimes
that result in such sanctions are serious.
316. Code p6nal [C. P8N.] art. 67 (Fr.).
317. TERRILL, supranote 2, at 148.
318. Id.
In France, a young offender reaches full adult criminal
responsibility at age eighteen. Id319. Id.
320. Id.
321. TERRILL, supranote 2, at 150.
322. Id.
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juvenile in close contact with the community.3 2 3 The institutions
that provide therapeutic education follow the basic assumption

that juvenile offenders, especially the very young, are in need of
care and supervision through the community as a whole. This
welfare goals that pervade the French
belief is consistent with 2the
3 4
juvenile justice system.
A comparison of the British and French juvenile systems and
their respective treatment of very young offenders who commit
violent crimes illustrates that the two systems have a very
different focus. While Venables and Thompson, both age eleven,
were given the equivalent of a life sentence for their roles in the
murder of Bulger, Boy T will be sentenced to therapeutic
education and will not be held criminally responsible for the
murder of Boura. It is troubling that such similar cases could
lead to such dramatically different results, but the different
results are based partly on one obvious factor-the two states'
respective ages of criminal responsibility.
The consensus among French experts who commented on the
Bulger case immediately after the Crown Court handed down the
conviction and sentence was that the French system was more

humane. 32 5 The French experts suggested that the punishment
of Thompson and Venables responded mainly to that society's
need for vengeance. 32 6 However, after the Boura murder, at least
one French commentator stated that the French system may be in
need of a change. A leading child psychiatrist commenting on the
Boy T case maintained that while the British system may be
viewed as inhumane, the French system tended to be too
sympathetic to the young offender. 32 7 The French system is
viewed as too lenient because it downplays the youth's
involvement in such a brutal crime and makes such actions seem
almost ordinary-an especially dangerous attitude for a young
child to have. The commentator contended that if society fails to
punish those who commit wrongs, the child will not understand
the difference between right and wrong. 3 28 The commentator
concluded that a juvenile justice system, above all, should instill
and reinforce in the minds of children an understanding of right
At present, the French system may fail to achieve
and wrong.
that goal. 3 29

323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.

Id.
Id.
See Bremner, supranote 297.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Given the increase in violent crime among the young in
today's world, the time has come to hold our youth accountable
for brutal and especially violent crimes against people. A criminal
system should focus primarily on the victims of crimes, and the
criminals should not be released into society until they are
completely rehabilitated. Society has a right to be protected from
violent criminals, regardless of their age. In order to ensure
society's safety, the age of criminal responsibility should be low
enough that criminals like Robert Thompson, John Venables, and
Boy T are punished for their crimes and removed from society
until their rehabilitation is complete.
Although a juvenile system should provide for the
punishment and rehabilitation of brutal young offenders, such a
system should have adequate safeguards so that young offenders
committing minor offenses are not incarcerated. Great Britain

has a system that distinguishes young offenders according to

their age and the type of crime committed. This system ensures
that young offenders are severely punished only when they
commit brutal crimes and the prosecution satisfies a heightened

burden of proof. Great Britain's age of criminal responsibility is
low enough to catch brutal murderers as young as age ten. While
the case of a child murderer might be extremely rare, Great

Britain has the mechanism in place if such a horror becomes a
reality, as it did in Liverpool.
The age of criminality in Great Britain meets the minimum
Holding children
standards set forth in the Beijing Rules.
criminally responsible at the age of ten realistically acknowledges
the true moral and psychological age of a ten-year-old in today's
sophisticated world. Most ten-year-olds know that beating a twoyear-old toddler to death is gravely wrong. If a child has the
emotional, mental, and intellectual capacity to reach the
conclusion that murder is wrong, then the child is old enough to
be held criminally responsible for such an action.
Arguably, it is society's duty to remove brutal juvenile
criminals from society and to punish children that violate the law.
Even critics of the British system agree that some children do
need to be punished and, therefore, the goal of a juvenile justice
system should be to separate those children who commit minor
crimes from those that commit violent crimes, punishing only the
latter. Commentators argue that such punishment will teach
children that they need to take responsibility for their actions. A
comment on the result of the Bulger case expresses the concept
most adequately: "If these lads had not been punished, society
would have let them down. If we don't get what we deserve, we
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have been let down-and punishment is what these two
deserved."3 0
However, young offenders should be incarcerated for two
First, incarceration will
reasons in addition to punishment.
Arguably, an offender cannot be
facilitate rehabilitation.
completely rehabilitated within the same society that apparently
trained and encouraged a child. killer. Non-institutional
rehabilitation is risky in the case of a child criminal who, if not
incarcerated, undoubtedly will come into further contact with the
bad influences in his or her life, perhaps before he or she can
resist them. A child who commits a brutal crime obviously has
difficulty functioning within the legal guidelines of society and,
thus, should not be released back into society until he or she is
able to act in accordance with its laws.
Second, a child criminal who commits a brutal crime should
be incarcerated to protect society. A juvenile justice system not
only owes a duty to the young offender, but also has a duty to his

or her victims. Incarcerating young offenders ensures that they
will be unable to cause more harm during their rehabilitation. In
the case of a child criminal, who many commentators argue
cannot understand the difference between right and wrong, such
incarceration is especially important. If a ten-year-old child is so
confused with regard to the meaning of right and wrong that the
child encounters no moral dilemma when beating a two-year-old
toddler to death, then the child should be removed from society,
for society's protection, until the distinction between right and
wrong is understood.
While it is true that a juvenile system does not have to hold a
child criminally responsible in order to "punish," "rehabilitate," or
"protect society" from a child criminal, it is perhaps the surest
way to accomplish all three. Otherwise, society may be left with
the brutal child criminal who fails to receive the rehabilitation he
or she so desperately needs because society does not want to
seem as if it is punishing a child. Most child criminals do not
need to be incarcerated to accomplish the previously mentioned
goals; however, the world community should consider whether
Great Britain's juvenile justice system might be the solution to
the very young, but brutal, criminal.
Stephanie J. Millet

330.

See Passmore, supra note 50, at 3.
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Appendix I - Structure of the British Court System*

House of Lords
Jurisdiction is limited to civil and criminal appeals from the
Court of Appeals and, in exceptional cases, from the High
Courts.

F

Court of Appeals

Intermediate appellate court for the entire British justice
system, consisting of both a civil and a criminal division.

FHigh

CourtI

Single court with both original and appellate jurisdiction.
It is divided into three divisions.

7

[Chancery Division

1

[Queen's Bench Division

Original jurisdiction in
matters dealing with
property, trusts, wills
and estates. Appellate
jurisdiction in income
tax and bankruptcy
cases.

]

Original and appellate
jurisdiction in civil
and criminal matters.
Jurisdiction over appeals
from the Crown Courts
and the Magistrates' Courts.

/

,

County Courts

[Family Division
Original and appellate
jurisdiction in
matters involving
matrimony,
guardianship,
and adoption.

I Crown Courts

Jurisdiction is
limited to civil
matters.

Exclusive jurisdiction over
all major criminal
cases and appeals from
Magistrates' Court convictions.

Magistrates' Courts I&
Jurisdiction over minor criminal cases.

J
Sjuvenile Courts (now Youth Courts)

Special sitting of the Magistrates' Court. Both civil and
criminal jurisdiction over individuals under the age of 17,
except murder cases.

*Adapted from RICHARD J. TERRILL, WORLD CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS: A

SURVEY 27-30, 79-80 (2d ed. 1992).

